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DÉBORA FOLLADOR

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS & COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN URBAN PLANNING PROCESSES: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF CURITIBA, BRAZIL, AND MONTREAL, CANADÁ

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
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
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Para Flávio,
pelas partes ...
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ABSTRACT

The practice of collaborative governance in urban planning is based on the idea that governments, civil society and private organizations are engaged in a collective public-policy-making process. However, little is known about the mechanisms and factors that are conducive to the "collaborative" dimension of collaborative governance and how it actually happens. Although the deliberative aspect and the role of the mediator are identified as key components of collaborative governance, the interactive/retroactive process remain elusive. How contextual conditions might facilitate or discourage the interactive dimension of collaborative governance? This research is based on three case studies of three planning processes that were carried out in Curitiba, Brazil, in 2004 and 2014, and in Montreal, Canada, in 2014, which resulted in the adoption of three urban plans. The 2004 Curitiba Master Plan was developed with limited participation, restricted to governmental organizations, universities and business sector. Because of a shift in the institutional arrangement of planning in Curitiba, the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan was developed within a more democratic framework, with the engagement of several governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations. The democratic practices of urban policies were theoretically and practically non-existent in Curitiba before the Master Plan development process was initiated in 2014. In Montreal, the Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD, in French) process started in 2014, in a context where consultation on local issues is common practice since the mid-1980s. Although efforts can be made to make a process collaborative, a governance process is situated in particular histories and geographies, and collectively shared values, cultures, norms and behaviors can help or hinder the emergence of inclusive democratic practices. Despite the differences between Curitiba and Montreal regarding the institutional arrangements, the momentum surrounding the analyzed processes and the cultures of urban planning and management, the findings of the study suggests some patterns of interactions in governance processes, which are related to the endurance of informal institutions, path dependence on ideas, behaviors and actions, co-optation processes, and to the communication message as a political and planning tool.

Keywords: Collaborative governance; Institutional Arrangement; Framing perspectives; Curitiba, Brazil; Montreal, Canada.

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ACRONYMS

ACP	Paraná Commercial Organization
CAUPR	Architecture and Urban Planning Council of Paraná
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CONCITIBA	Curitiba city commission
CONSECON	IPPUC Advisory Council
FIEP	Federation of Industries of Paraná
FPICs	Public functions of common interest
IPPUC	Curitiba Research and Urban Planning Institute
LAU	Quebec's Act respecting land use planning and development
MAMROT	Ministry of Municipal Affairs and of Territory Occupation
OAB	Brazilian Lawyers Association
OCPM	Montreal Public Consultation Office
PDUI	Integrated urban development plan
PDM	Montreal Development Plan
PMAD	Metropolitan land use and development plan
RCM	Regional county municipality
SAD	Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan
SENGE/PR	State of Paraná Union of engineers
SINDARQ/PR	State of Paraná Union of Architects
SINDUSCON/PR	State of Paraná Construction Industry Union
URBS	Urbanização de Curitiba S/A
UWC-CC	United Way of Canada (Centraide Canada organization, in French)

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1   INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a result of a cotutelle PhD program between Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná (PUCPR), Brazil, and Université Laval, Canada. In accordance to the requirements established in the agreement by these universities, the dissertation is composed of three papers. The papers cover different urban planning processes that were carried out in 2004 and 2014 in Curitiba, Brazil, and in 2014 in Montreal, Canada, addressing analyses related to collaborative governance and institutional arrangements.

1.1   Context & Research Problem

Collaborative governance emerged as a result of countless unsuccessful experiences in planning and implementing public policies. According to Ansell and Gash (2007) and Morse and Stephens (2012), collaborative governance was developed as an alternative to pluralism, as a process by which the various stakeholders are engaged in collective actions. Governance, unlike government, looks at the interplay between the state and civil society and the extent to which collective projects can be achieved through the commitment of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders (Healey, 1997; Pierre, 2011).

Interactions, dialog, discursive practices, negotiations and conflict management are at the heart of the collaborative governance. According to Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) and Morse and Stephens (2012), the term *collaborative* is added to *governance* to emphasize the nature of the process by which stakeholders are willing to negotiate approaches, consensus building, and to maximize collective mutual gains. In this process, social groups manage their collective affairs, which are shaped by wider economic, social and environmental forces that structure but do not determine specific interactions (Healey, 2003).

By integrating the contributions from public and private stakeholders, the practice of collaborative governance in urban planning allows (at least in theory) plans and policies to overcome technical and economic issues and represent collective concerns (Healey, 1997). When developed through the engagement of governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations, urban planning is expected to correspond to the needs of the cities, legitimizing the collective interests and values embodied in such terms as the

"common good" or the "public interest" (Healey, 1997; Weir, Rongerude & Ansell, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2012). This expectation is based on the idea that adding stakeholders who collaborate in the process alters policy bias that may exist, favoring a broader socioeconomic impact of urban policies (Weir, Rongerude & Ansell, 2008).

Engaging actors and organizations which have traditionally been excluded from the process might also provide new human resources and future political leaders (Frey, 2007). Through coalitions between governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations, social problems will be more effectively solved (or at least mitigated) (Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009). Success in these efforts depends on the establishment of alliances that improve long-term relationships and ensure accountability, on consensus building among stakeholders, and on the stakeholders' ability to re-think problems and challenges, resulting in actions that may commit them to changing established practices (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Healey, 1997; Weir, Rongerude, Ansell, 2008).

In fact, for collaboration to work, an alignment between stakeholder interests and perspectives must occur (Gray, 2004), and these adaptations can help resolve disagreements (Kaufman, Elliott, Shmueli, 2003). Over time, new positions and frames of reference emerge, agreements are reached, and interventions are generated (Healey, 2006). Although the deliberative dimension and the role of the mediator are identified as key aspects of collaborative governance, little is known about the mechanisms and factors that are conducive to the "collaborative" dimension of collaborative governance and how collaboration actually takes place (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kapucu, Yuldashev, Barkiev, 2009).

Most of the literature on collaborative governance consists of single case studies focusing on issues in a specific sector such as local management, community policing, watershed councils, negotiating regulations, community health partnerships, and co-management of natural resources (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Consequently, Ansell and Gash (2007) classified studies of collaborative governance that portray the interaction among variables, confidence-building, development of shared understanding, and formation of a collective commitment as "particularly valuable." Similarly, Kapucu, Yuldashev, and Barkiev (2009) maintained that research on these processes is useful in assessing the performance of this type of management.

In the light of a normative approach, this study attempts to fill this gap by comparing different institutional arrangements in urban planning, while assessing the collaborative aspect in the analyzed governance processes. The study focuses on the qualities of interactions in urban planning processes, which according to Healey (2003) depend not only on the interplay of actors and organizations with specific interests, but also on the way social relations, practices, values, and conceptions are structured. This is even more relevant and important in urban contexts, where the interests of government, private actors, and citizens are spatially intertwined. Analysis of different episodes of urban planning reveals the impact differences in cultural practices might have on the processes and on their final results.

1.2   Research Questions and Hypothesis

The central research question of this study is:

- *How might contextual conditions facilitate or discourage the interactive dimension of collaborative governance?*

From the main question of this study, three sub-questions are investigated:

- *Do technocratic and collaborative planning processes lead to different results?*

- *Which elements are responsible for the endurance of established practices in urban planning processes?*

- *Which structures and processes facilitate or hinder the interactive dimension of collaborative governance?*

Our assumption is that the existence of path dependence in informal institutions and the lack of reframings in the institutional arrangement represent an obstacle to collaboration.

1.3   Rationale for Study

The goal of this study is to assess the impacts of the composition of the institutional arrangements on urban planning in order to evaluate the influence of history of conflict and alliances, the role of the mediator, and framing perspectives in governance processes. A secondary goal is to explore the mechanisms and factors that interfere in the interactive

dimension of governance and which are conducive to the "collaborative" dimension of collaborative governance. The research compares three planning processes that were carried out in Curitiba, Brazil in 2004 and 2014 and in Montreal, Canada in 2014, which resulted in the adoption of three urban development plans. The Curitiba and Montreal processes were selected because despite their different cultures of urban planning and management, the importance of democratic planning was highlighted in both cases.

In the **first paper**, "Institutional arrangements and political shifts in Curitiba, Brazil: a comparative analysis of the 2004 and 2014 Master Plans," a comparative study is conducted between two Master Plan processes that were carried out in Curitiba. The cases were selected based on the assumption that between these two processes there was a shift in the institutional arrangement of the urban planning. The 2004 process was developed with limited participation, and was restricted to governmental organizations, universities, and the business sector. In the 2014 process, the institutional arrangement presented a more democratic composition, increased by a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations, in addition to the stakeholders who participated in the 2004 process. By comparing these two processes, this study discusses whether the changes in the institutional arrangement of Curitiba have altered the technocratic practices that marked the planning of the city, and clarifies whether and how this was reflected in the content of the newly approved Master Plan.

Despite the differences in the composition of the institutional arrangement and in the planning practices adopted in each process, the evidence presented in the first paper showed that the content of the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan is as general as the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan. If the 2004 and 2014 institutional arrangements and processes were so different, why have they achieved similar results? In the **second paper, "**Informal institutions and the phenomenon of path dependence in urban planning processes," we argue that the final product of a planning process is heavily influenced by the existing institutions, in spite of the new composition of institutional arrangements. In order to explore the endurance of technocratic practices in an institutional arrangement with a more democratic composition, a case study was conducted on the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process.

If different institutional arrangements achieved similar results, which elements and interactions among the variables facilitate or hinder collaboration in governance

processes? In the **third paper,** "Patterns of interaction in urban planning: hindrances to collaborative governance in Curitiba, Brazil and Montreal, Canada," two case studies were conducted on Curitiba, where urban planning has historically been technocratic, and Montreal, where consultative processes have been common practice since the mid-1980s. In Curitiba, the participatory process surrounding the 2014 Master Plan was selected, because it was the first plan since the 2012 municipal elections won by a left-leaning political coalition engaged in democratic planning. In Montreal, the consultative process leading to the adoption of the Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD, in French) was selected because it was the most recent plan developed at the local level. Selecting two culturally different cases allowed us to identify crucial moments or key variables that were determinant in the interactions between public and private actors.

1.4   Literature Review

1.4.1   Collaborative governance

Collaborative governance is a process involving governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations in which decisions and accords are based on consensus (Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Ansell, 2008; Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009; Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2012; O'Brien, 2012). Since it is aimed at consensus, a collaborative process should create conditions for the collective pursuit of the common good, providing opportunities for learning, mutual listening, and ensuring broad participation and equality (Frey, 2007; Ansell, 2008). Actors and organizations will invest their efforts in processes that they believe will ensure their own prospects (North, 2003).

Difficulties in implementing collaborative governance can be generated by manipulation of the process by some stakeholders, by a lack of commitment to cooperation, as well as uncertainty about the purpose of the process and distrust among the stakeholders (Gray, 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2007). Furthermore, inertia in bureaucratic organizations can also impair development of democratic processes (Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009). Similarly, a lack of satisfactory approaches promoting understanding of existing frameworks and appropriate new positions and frames of reference can derail collaborative initiatives (Gray, 2004).

Consequently, it is important that the common goal of transforming antagonistic relations into other more cooperative alliances be established (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Stakeholders in a collaborative governance process should therefore be flexible in developing new ways of thinking and acting, establish horizontal relationships between themselves, and be willing to make changes in existing systems (O´Brien, 2012).

Processes have process outcomes. The legitimacy of a collaborative process depends on its being inclusive, and attempts in the opposite direction might threaten legitimacy or set the process directly on the path toward a failed collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009; O'Brien, 2012). According to O'Brien (2012), all individuals and interest groups in all sectors of society have a right to meaningful participation in decisions they believe will affect them. The results of a collaborative process will be questioned if the stakeholders assess that there was no space for them to participate, or in other words, if they feel they were not part of the process (O'Brien, 2012). Only groups that consider they had opportunities to participate are likely to legitimize and develop a commitment to the process (Ansell & Gash, 2007). These perceptions generate perspectives that may be carried forward into subsequent episodes of governance (Healey, 2003).

From a more pragmatic perspective, an attempt was made to identify conditioning factors which influence a collaborative governance process. Based on Gray (2004), Agranoff (2006), Ansell, Gash (2007), Frey (2007), Kapucu, Yuldashev, Barkiev (2009), Morse, Stephens (2012), O´Brien (2012), and Vodoz (2013), the following elements were diagnosed: history of conflicts and alliances; incentives and interests for actors and organizations to participate; the balance of knowledge, power, and resources; mediator performance; communication; construction and levels of trust between the stakeholders; social capital[1]; development of a culture of collaboration and learning; establishment of mission and common goals–consensus; openness to mutual gains; development of commitment, understanding, purpose, and shared vision; framing perspectives; reframing; interdependence among the stakeholders; incorporation of proposals arising from the process into the final result.

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[1] Social capital refers to the connections between people: their social networks and the level of reciprocity and trust built between them (O´Brien, 2012).

1.4.2   Institutional Arrangements

A governance process is situated in particular histories and geographies, and collectively shared values, cultures, norms and behaviors can contribute to or hinder its emergence (Healey, 1997). These shared habits of thought and action (informal institutions), laws and regulations (formal institutions), and different governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations comprise institutional arrangements (Souto-Maior & Gondim, 1992; Aoki, 2007).

Institutions establish social norms of behavior which are incorporated in social relations. In order to be sustained and viable as an institution, rules and beliefs need to become a habit shared in a society and continually reconfirmed and reproduced through actors and organizations (Aoki, 2007). The existence, propagation, endurance, and transformation of institutions are conditioned to a collectively shared consensus (North, 1991; 1992; 2003; Denzau & North, 1994; Tsebelis, 1998; Hodgson, 2006; Aoki, 2007). By reproducing shared habits (in other words, shared thoughts), actors and organizations create strong mechanisms of conformity and regulatory agreement (Hodgson, 2006).

Beliefs and actions are subject to a process of selection and adaptation to habits that are more suited to the time, which might result in institutional change (Lopes, 2013). Change or transformation in institutions will occur when there is a substantial shift in the strategies and behavioral beliefs shared by actors and organizations, signaling a crisis (Aoki, 2007). In this situation, competition can arise between new forms of play and efforts to preserve the existing pattern of play. If the conflict persists, a sense of anomie can spread and changes in the institutions must occur (Aoki, 2007). However, processes of change can be slow or difficult. Lopes (2013) explains that inertia is subject to the formal institutional structure and also to the stagnation of mental models, which by configuring structures that are rigid and resistant to adaptation prevent social change.

Because institutions systematically produce certain types of results, these can be modified in order to change political outcomes (Tsebelis, 1998). Knowledge of the results obtained by different institutions can transform political preferences into institutional preferences. The set of possibilities of choice in the present are strictly dependent on past choices and institutions, corresponding to the path dependence phenomenon (North, 1991). As stated by Clemens (2010), the repertoire of the institutional arrangement constituted by the experience and perception of those involved reflects as well as forms

their patterns of social interaction. Thus, the institutional arrangement composition can provide a favorable ground for or be a hindrance to the emergence of inclusive democratic practices (Healey, 1997).

1.4.3   Framing perspectives

Stakeholder perceptions regarding the object and the involved parties affect participation in urban planning processes (Souto-Maior & Gondim, 1992). This perception, called *frames* or *framing* (Benford & Snow, 2000; Kaufman, Elliott, Shmueli, 2003; Gray, 2004)*,* is referred to as *framing perspectives* in this study, because the term conveys the notion that a frame is, in fact, a particular way of understanding and interfering in a political context

Since framing perspectives define the way stakeholders interpret situations and structure their relationship to other stakeholders, they have been considered central to understanding the character and course of governance processes (Souto-Maior & Gondim, 1992; Benford & Snow, 2000; Kaufman, Elliott, Shmueli, 2003; Gray, 2004). For Benford and Snow (2000), in addition to the framing perspectives developed individually, there are also collective framing perspectives resulting from the negotiation of shared meaning.

Divergence among framing perspectives might hamper collaboration (Gray, 2004). Considering that many different framing perspectives are involved in an institutional arrangement, conflicting relationships between the stakeholders engaged in collective processes are common (North, 2003). If the stakeholders thoroughly adhere to an individual framing perspective, identifying a common task for collaboration can become difficult. Rather than cooperate, stakeholders might see the actions or positions of others as a threat to their assumptions, and therefore behave defensively to guarantee that their identity remains intact (Gray, 2004). The dispute over framing perspectives is the dispute over reality (existing or projected). The challenge, therefore, is to identify how reality should be presented in a manner that maximizes mobilization/collaboration, seeking collective gains (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Most actors and organizations usually seek to negotiate in win-lose terms (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). If the stakeholders can recognize their different framing perspectives and, on this basis develop new common frames for problems and solutions,

they have the potential to reach a collaborative solution. However, even if gains are made in resolving adversities, the lack of environments conducive to negotiating disagreements and achieving harmony between stakeholders can make collaboration unfeasible (North, 2003). Consequently, stakeholders must shift the established set of meanings and open themselves up to new cultural conceptions and new systems of understanding, influencing the allocation of resources within a governance process (Healey, 1997). Instead of maintaining the win-lose perspective, reframing permits a sense of commitment among the stakeholders to seek collective objectives (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). For this reason, Gray (2004) considers reframing processes central to viable collaborative partnerships.

Despite the importance of reframing processes, the framing perspectives developed by actors and organizations often remain stable over time. This stability, explains Kaufman, Elliott and Shmueli (2003), results from the fact that such frameworks tend toward individual self-reinforcement as well as social reinforcement through common perspectives shared in a society. The multiplicity of stakeholders and their framing perspectives call for the presence of a mediator who can promote the establishment of a new collective value (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Gray, 2004; Schwarz, 2006; Ansell, Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012). A mediator is substantially neutral, and remains outside disputes between stakeholders, fostering the transparency of the process and helping to identify and visualize the problems to be solved (Ansell & Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012).

1.5 Methodology

In order to analyze how contextual conditions might facilitate or discourage the interactive dimension of collaborative governance, three case studies were conducted on three planning processes that were carried out in Curitiba, Brazil in 2004 and 2014, and in Montreal, Canada in 2014, which resulted in the adoption of three urban plans.

The case studies are organized in three papers.

In the **first paper**, "Institutional arrangements and political shifts in Curitiba, Brazil: a comparative analysis of the 2004 and 2014 Master Plans", a comparative study is conducted between the Master Plan processes that were carried out in Curitiba, Brazil, in 2004 and 2014. In the **second paper, "**Informal institutions and path dependence in urban planning: the case of Curitiba, Brazil", a case study was conducted on the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process. In the **third paper,** "Patterns of interaction in urban planning:

hindrances to collaborative governance in Curitiba, Brazil and Montreal, Canada," two case studies were conducted on the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process and the Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD, in French).

1.5.1   Framework of analysis

Our understanding of the dynamic of collaborative processes is based on the models developed by Ansell and Gash (2007), Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012), and Morse and Stephens (2012). The first two focus on the interaction among variables considered important by the authors, and the third focuses on the phases of collaborative governance processes and the respective competencies that are required to ensure collaboration.

According to Ansell and Gash (2007), greater attention should be paid to the interactive effects of trust and interdependence among stakeholders, because these elements maintain the actors' and organizations' interest in the process (Figure 01).

Figure 01: The Ansell and Gash Collaborative Governance Model

Source: Ansell and Gash (2007)

In the model developed by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012), emphasis is given to causal interactions between the different phases of collaborative processes and its components, since different phases call for different levels of stakeholder involvement (Figure 02).

Figure 02: The Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh Collaborative Governance Model

Source: Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012)

In the model proposed by Morse and Stephens (2012), although some abilities are related to specific phases of collaborative governance, some are required during the entire process such as willingness to create public value, systems thinking, openness and risk taking, and a sense of mutuality and connectedness (Frame 01).

Frame 01: Phases of Collaborative Governance

Assessment	Initiation	Deliberation	Implementation
Is collaboration necessary? Are preconditions in place? Who are the stakeholders? Who might fill key roles (sponsor, convener, and facilitator)?	How to frame the issue? How to engage stakeholders? Who/what else is needed? What kind of process?	How to develop effective working group? What ground rules? How to invent options and decide? How to facilitate mutual learning?	Who will do what? How to broaden support? What kind of governance structure? How to monitor progress?

Source: Morse, Stephens (2012)

While the phases described above tend to emphasize certain competencies, many skills are important in many or all stages. The competencies identified by the authors,

which are organized by stages, are meant for leaders and public managers involved in a process of collaborative governance, and are described in the chart below (Frame 02).

Frame 02: Competencies of Collaborative Governance

Assessment	Initiation	Deliberation	Implementation
Issue analysis Environmental assessment Stakeholder identification Strategic thinking	Stakeholder engagement Political/community organizing Building social capital Process design	Group facilitation Team building and group dynamics Listening Consensus building Interest-based negotiation	Developing action plans Designing governance structures Public engagement Network management Conflict resolution Performance evaluation
Meta-Competencies			
Collaborative mind-set Passion for creating public value Systems thinking		Openness and risk taking Sense of mutuality and connectedness Humility or measured ego	

Source: Morse, Stephens (2012)

These authors observed that various "meta-competencies" cross the phases of collaboration and based their approach to collaboration on general terms. For example, the authors cite the meta-competency of systems thinking, which predicts impacts on future generations, consequences beyond immediate concerns, and thinking about issues and strategies, as well as the "collaborative mind-set", which involves incorporating a long-term vision.

1.5.2   Heuristic tool

To understand the dynamics within institutional arrangements and their influence in governance processes, a heuristic tool was developed based on the theoretical framework of analysis presented in Section 1.4, This tool takes into account key elements of the models developed by Ansell & Gash (2007), Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2012), and Morse & Stephens (2012) which were presented in Section 1.5.1. (Figure 03).

For collaboration to happen, adjustments must be made among stakeholders throughout the process. Actors and organizations enter into the governance process with their own interests and histories of conflicts and alliances. Their participation is colored by both their interests and past relationships, and can also be motivated by incentives (or

disincentives). Once they are part of the governance process, actors and organizations have their own framing perspectives which make them prioritize the key components of the planning process, assess each problem, and identify preferred solutions. The mediator is the neutral actor who conciliates the stakeholders' different framing perspectives while taking into account formal and informal institutions. Collaboration happens when participants go through a reframing phase or process in which they rebalance their initial beliefs and priorities, after understanding the viewpoint of other participants.

Figure 3: Heuristic tool for collaborative governance

Source: Author, 2016, based on Ansell & Gash (2007), Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2012), Morse & Stephens (2012)

With this heuristic model, we are able to understand the interaction of variables in governance processes, and also to clarify the elements and proceedings that influence the collaborative dimension of governing processes.

In this study, the heuristic tool was used as a lens to understand the dynamics within the institutional arrangements of the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan and the 2015 Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD, in French) and their influence in the processes (which correspond to Paper 03).

1.5.3   Data collection procedure & instruments

In the **first paper**, "Institutional arrangements and political shifts in Curitiba, Brazil: a comparative analysis of the 2004 and 2014 Master Plans," data is based on planning documents, media coverage, and academic literature, as well as 10 semi-structured interviews with key informants who represent the variety of organizations and actors involved in the planning process in Curitiba in different occasions.

In the **second paper, "**Informal institutions and path dependence in urban planning: the case of Curitiba, Brazil" data is based on 10 semi-structured interviews with organizations and actors that played a prominent role in the 2014 planning process — some of them also involved in the previous process of 2004 Curitiba Master Plan.

In the **third paper,** "Patterns of interaction in urban planning: hindrances to collaborative governance in Curitiba, Brazil and Montreal, Canada", two case studies were conducted on the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process and the Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD, in French). Data is based on 20 semi-structured interviews (10 in each city) with key respondents who represent the variety of organizations and actors involved in the planning process and/or urban development in Curitiba and Montreal, and is supplemented with planning documents, media coverage, as well as academic literature. The heuristic tool presented in Section 1.5.2. was used as a lens to understand the dynamics within the institutional arrangements of the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan and the 2015 Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD, in French) and their influence in these processes.

The semi-structured interview protocol was composed of 19 questions organized into five categories: i) the characteristics of the respondent; ii) the institutional arrangement, the framing perspectives and the interaction among the stakeholders; iii) the history of conflicts and mediations; iv) stakeholder involvement in the process; and v) stakeholder evaluation of the process (see Appendices 09 and 10). Interviews, transcriptions and a qualitative analysis were carried out in 2015 and 2016. Each transcription was analyzed using the indicators presented in the List of Quotes (see Appendix 13) and in the Research Protocol (see Appendix 14).

Respondents were recruited via e-mail (see Appendices 05 and 07) and by phone. Key respondents in each city were identified based on public hearing documents, media coverage, and recommendations from informants, as described below (Table 01):

Table 01 – Selection of Respondents – Curitiba and Montreal

PROFILE OF RESPONDENT	SEGMENT	ORGANIZATION OF THE RESPONDENT	REPRESENTATIVE	ROLE IN THE PROCESS
Governmental organizations	Public Sector			
Non-governmental organizations	Social Movements and Popular Organizations			
Academia, press, civil society	Academia			
	Press			
	Civil society			

Source: Author, 2015

1.5.4   Paper structure

The structure of the three developed papers is presented below (Table 02):

Table 02 – Matrix of papers, research questions and methodologies

	Paper 1	Paper 2	Paper 3
Title	Institutional arrangements and political shifts in Curitiba, Brazil: a comparative analysis of the 2004 and 2014 Master Plans	Informal institutions and path dependence in urban planning: the case of Curitiba, Brazil	False pretensions in collaborative governance: patterns of interaction in Curitiba and Montreal
Year of conclusion	2016	2016	2017
Research question	Do technocratic and collaborative planning processes lead to different results?	Which elements are responsible for the endurance of established practices in urban planning processes?	Which structures and processes facilitate or hinder the interactive dimension of collaborative governance?
Method	Documentary research, semi-structured interviews and qualitative analysis	Documentary research, semi-structured interviews and qualitative analysis	Documentary research, semi-structured interviews, heuristic tool and qualitative analysis
Case study	2004 Curitiba Master Plan process and 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process	2014 Curitiba Master Plan process	2014 Curitiba Master Plan process and Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD, in French)

Source: Author, 2015

1.5.5 Outline of dissertation

This dissertation is structured in four sections, in addition to this introduction.

The second section is dedicated to the **first paper**. It begins by establishing the conceptual framework of the institutional arrangements and the elements that compose them, namely institutions, organizations and actors, against the backdrop of collaborative governance. Next, the 2004 and 2014 institutional arrangements of urban planning in Curitiba are presented and then compared. We finally conclude by identifying whether the institutional shifts are reshaping the urban planning process in Curitiba.

The **second paper** is presented in the third section. Following the literature review, the formal spaces in which the 2014 Master Plan was drafted are presented. Next the institutional arrangement related to the planning process is presented, highlighting its composition and institutional context. Before the conclusion, we present the analyses regarding the process of collaborative governance in Curitiba through the lenses of the existing institutional arrangement.

In the fourth section, the **third paper** is presented, which begins with the literature review and is followed by the methodology and the techniques used in the analysis. The cases of Curitiba and Montreal are then contextualized, particularly with regard to their planning regimes, and the study results for each city are presented. Both planning processes are then compared, shedding light on the aspect of stakeholder interaction. The results are finally discussed through the lenses of the developed heuristic tool (see Figure 03) and are summarized in the conclusion.

In order to conclude, we return to the initial questions in the fifth and final section, highlighting and extending discussions related to the evidence presented in the papers, which suggests some patterns of interactions in collaborative governance processes.

2 PAPER 01: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND POLITICAL SHIFTS IN CURITIBA, BRAZIL: a comparative analysis of the 2004 and 2014 Master Plans

Abstract: Institutional arrangements are formed by institutions, organizations and actors, and the way these elements relate to each other. In theory, different institutional arrangements result in different public policies. In this article we focus on Curitiba, Brazil, a flagship city of urban planning and public transportation in Latin America. Despite its national and international success, the city is also recognized for its technocratic government, with two public organizations (URBS and IPPUC) determining its development, and for having the same political group in power for more than four decades. However, the 2012 municipal elections and the 2013 nationwide political upheaval led to a change in the city institutional arrangement. As a consequence, the 2014 Master Plan was conceived with the tagline of more public participation. In this article we analyze whether the recent changes in institutional arrangements influenced the city's planning process, and how this new arrangement is reflected in the new Master Plan. The bottom-line question is: do technocratic and democratic planning processes actually lead to different results?

Keywords: Institutional Arrangements; Urban Planning; Master Plan; Curitiba.

2.1 Introduction

Public policies and regulations are shaped by the interactions among organizations (i.e. associations or groups of individuals united by a function or an ideology, such as a company or regulatory agency), actors (understood as individuals who acquire a degree of representativeness that parallels those of an organization) and institutions (i.e. formal and informal norms, and shared habits of thought and action) (McFarlane, Solomon & Memon, 2015). These elements form institutional arrangements, which are at the core of urban planning processes (Fiani, 2013).

Curitiba, in Brazil, is internationally known for having land use and public transport as the crux of its urban development, which made the city a reference in Latin America. Part of its success is due to the fact that a same political group remained in power for four decades. While on the one hand this continuity was responsible for enforcing the main points of a successful planning framework of the city, initially proposed in the late 1960s, on the other hand it led to an increasing criticism related to the stiffening of the institutional arrangement marked by a technocratic management, which openly or tacitly blocked wider participation in planning processes.

Reverberating nationwide protests against unsatisfactory municipal policies and lack of subsidies to public services and infrastructure, the 2012 municipal elections marked the change of the political group which managed Curitiba for decades. With a left-leaning political group rising to power, in 2014 the city started the revision of its Master Plan, based on the idea that a new institutional arrangement would lead to novel ways of planning the city. The discourse of this new political group emphasized that the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process would be based on collaborative governance, including a variety of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the development of the plan.

Considering the relative success of the urban solutions implemented in Curitiba, the city is an interesting case to ask the question: do technocratic and collaborative planning processes lead to different results? This article discusses whether the changes in the institutional arrangement of Curitiba have altered the technocratic practices that marked the planning of the city, and clarifies whether and how it was reflected in the content of the

newly approved Master Plan. In order to explore whether technocratic and collaborative planning processes lead to different results, in this paper we analyze the institutional arrangements present during the elaboration of the most recent Master Plans of Curitiba: 2004 and 2014.

As the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan has been only recently approved, the analysis of its implementation is infeasible. Nevertheless, following Roy & Mercier (2016), analyzing the planning process might shed light on broader institutional changes, whether and how it is reflected on the final results of the planning process, and whether there are indices that public participation (in the case of collaborative processes) will continue to happen during the implementation phase.

Data is based on planning documents, media coverage, academic literature, as well as 10 semi-structured interviews with key informants who represent the variety of organizations and actors involved in the planning process in Curitiba in different occasions (see Appendix 01 – Selection of respondents). The respondents were identified based on public hearing documents, media coverage, and recommendations from informants.

This article is structured in three sections, in addition to this introduction. It begins by establishing the conceptual framework of institutional arrangements and the elements that compose them, namely institutions, organizations and actors, within the background of collaborative governance. Secondly, the 2004 and 2014 institutional arrangements of the urban planning in Curitiba are presented. Thirdly, we compare the institutional arrangements in play during the elaboration of the 2004 and 2014 Master Plans in Curitiba. Finally, we conclude by identifying whether the institutional shifts are reshaping the urban planning process in Curitiba.

2.2   Defining the Conceptual Limits

2.2.1   Institutional Arrangements

Institutional arrangements are composed of institutions, organizations, and actors. North (1991; 1992; 2003) classifies institutions metaphorically as the "rules of the game" in a society. They are responsible for guiding interactions between actors and organizations, structuring incentives in political, social and economic exchanges. The institutions define

the stimuli that determine individual choices which will form society over time. These "rules of the game" can be formal or informal.

Both formal rules (constitutions, laws) and informal constraints (routines, customs, traditions, cultures, and codes of conduct) are determining elements in the behavior of actors and organizations, and also have the role of reducing uncertainties in a society (North, 1991; 1992). Habits, which are important when they become collective, are understood to be thoughts that can be triggered or reinforced by a stimulus or context, establishing regulatory agreements in society and thus providing greater durability to the institutions (Hodgson, 2006).

The relationship between rule and habit occurs in the sense that the rules should be incorporated into the habits of the actors, creating a kind of collective mentality or shared thinking, to then acquire legal status and become an institution (Aoki, 2007; Hodgson, 2006). In order to be sustained and viable as an institution, rules and beliefs needs to be continually reconfirmed and reproduced through actors and organizations.

In short, institutions are norms shared in a society and are susceptible to change according to the joint action of organizations and actors that affects the collective mentality and behavior.

Organizations include companies, political parties, regulatory agencies, schools, and any other form of social groups that share common values and are recognized by others by such values. Actors are individuals whose political role has acquired such an importance that they can influence organizations, institutions, and public opinion. Organizations and actors conform and are conformed by the institutions.

With the concepts of institution, organization, and actor established, institutional arrangements can be defined. In the words of Souto-Maior & Gondim (1992: 5), institutional arrangements comprise "the set of public and private organizations, [actors], rules and laws [in other words, institutions] responsible for formulating and implementing a particular policy." For Fiani, (2013: 27), "an institutional arrangement specifies which actors [and organizations] are qualified to carry out a certain transaction, the object (or objects) of the transaction, and the forms of interactions between the actors while the transaction is being carried out, with the arrangement subject to the more general parameters of the institutional environment".

In summary, the institutional arrangement is the group comprised by institutions, organizations, and actors, as well as the way in which these elements are related to each other, guiding and governing the development, behavior, relationships, and actions in a particular environment.

2.2.2 Collaborative governance

Governance refers to processes through which collective affairs are managed, legitimizing political communities, embodied in such terms as the "common good" or the "public interest" (Healey, 1997: 206). In order to promote inclusionary practices, referred to the planning style of governance, is necessary a sympathetic governance culture which will facilitate collaboration and consensus building within the institutional arrangement (Healey, 1997).

Generally speaking, the way in which policies are formulated influences the results. Adding actors who collaborate in the process alters an eventual existing policy bias, thus favoring the consideration of broader socioeconomic impacts of policies (Weir, Rongerude & Ansell, 2008). Frey (2007: 8) supports this notion by stating that "studies have shown evidence that expanding participation also provides new human 'resources' and future political leaders, and opens the political arena to parts of the population which have traditionally been excluded."

Collaborative governance, expressed in public participation, has emerged as a solution to the technocratic rational planning crisis (Gariépy & Roy-Baillargeon, 2016). For Vodoz (2013) and Cheyne (2015), public participation means the process of voluntary negotiation between actors and organizations that are mobilized to address collective issues. This democratic government is based on the principle that it is a basic right for people to participate in decision-making processes that affect them (Cheyne, 2015).

Once institutional arrangements are formed by different stakeholders, collaborative processes are seen to be essential in urban planning processes, so that the various demands can be analyzed and made compatible (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012).

Based on this understanding, in the next section we contextualize the institutional arrangements in the Curitiba planning process; then, we identify the institutional structures present within the arenas of the processes for drafting the 2004 and 2014 Curitiba Master

Plans, and finally we propose a comparative analysis of the respective laws derived from these plans.

2.3 Identification of the Institutional Arrangements

2.3.1 Curitiba Urban Planning and the conformation of its institutional arrangements

The first Curitiba Master Plan was commissioned from the French urban planner Alfred Agache in 1943. Brazil at the time was experiencing the political instability of a populist dictatorship, whose government considered that there were no citizens, but instead "the people, the statistical mass devoid of mean for expressing own interests" (Dudeque, 2010: 68). In this context, the Agache plan was prepared without any contact with the population, and was mostly composed of a general set of proposals that could be applied in other Brazilian capitals.

Twenty years passed, along with a population growth of approximately 34%. The 1965 Master Plan was commissioned from a private company from São Paulo, Brazil. At this time, Brazil was again under a dictatorship, this time by the military, which would last until 1985. During this military dictatorship, the mayors of the state capitals were appointed by the federal government, and public manifestations of any kind were suppressed.

In order to implement and enforce the 1965 Master Plan, two municipal agencies were created: URBS (Urbanização de Curitiba S/A), founded in 1964, which would become the traffic and transportation authority, and IPPUC (the Curitiba Research and Urban Planning Institute), founded in 1965, which would detail the Master Plan, and since became the urban planning authority.

The importance of this plan, approved by the city council in 1966, is such that it has been shaping the city until today. During four decades, the plan underwent regular adjustments although its general principles were maintained; and such adjustments were the result of technical demands, without any popular debate.

Actually, the constant adjustments were more the result of unforeseen transformations in the urban space (such as population growth exceeding official projections) than direct demands from citizens. Moreover, private interests involving bus fleet owners, real estate developers, and public works contractors made direct

arrangements with public authorities–without participating in any sort of public forums (Moura, 2014).

Nevertheless, the full implementation of the Master Plan, the consolidation of the links between land use and public transport, and the creation of urban parks made the city known in Brazil and abroad through urban marketing strategies, especially in the 1990s. As an example of endurance of its international recognition, since 2014 Curitiba received 31 national and international awards—15 of them directly related to planning and city management (Curitiba, 2016).

Based on this relative success and marketing strategies, an unanimous and simplified image of the city was established, promoted internally and externally (Moura, 2014; Sánchez, 2003). This strategy boosted civic pride around a model city that kept at bay emerging social demands and problems, such as social and spatial segregation, housing deficit, and the growth in individual car ownership.

As a result of the redemocratization of Brazil, a new constitution was approved in 1988. It granted municipalities autonomy to elect mayors and develop Master Plans. Also, a long process of national debates resulted in the City Statute, a federal law approved in 2001 that mandates popular participation in city planning, and that Master Plans must be revised every 10 years. Criticisms toward Curitiba's technocratic approach to planning became bitter.

As mandated by the City Statute, Curitiba had to revise its Master Plan in 2004. As a response to the critics of its technocratic approach, Curitiba adopted the "collaborative model", based on an initiative developed by the Solidarity Community Council and the Canadian Cooperation Office (CIDA), as well as the United Way of Canada-Centraide Canada organization[2] (UWC-CC). This management model sought to expand public-private partnerships, decentralize urban management, and implement new forms of cooperation with society in the search for shared solutions (Frey, 2007).

Despite this intention, critics saw that IPPUC, the municipal agency responsible for the planning process, limited participation to the private sector, university intellectuals, and

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[2] United Way of Canada (Centraide Canada, in French) is an organization which was officially founded in 1976 and aims to "create opportunities for a better life for everyone", involving individuals and mobilizing collective action (UWC-CC, 2015).

urban planning professionals, designing special committees and holding public hearings in awkward times and venues—what critics pointed as a deliberate way to avoid wider public participation (Mobiliza[3], 2014; Moura, 2014). Thus, the 2004 Master Plan continued a history of planning among peers, led by the same political group which were in power for forty years.

Considering this framework, it was expected that the 10-year review of the Master Plan, scheduled for 2014 according to the City Statute (Brasil, 2001), would be a simple formality. However, intense popular manifestations demanding more participation and improvements in the area of urban planning erupted in major cities across the country in 2013. They were like "an earthquake which disturbed the order of a country that seemed to live in a kind of beneficial vertigo of prosperity and peace, and led to the emergence of not one, but a multitude of unresolved agendas" (Rolnik, 2013: 11). Vainer (2013: 62) emphasizes such manifestations as being "mass demonstrations that have changed the face of everyday life in our cities". In this context, the social movements in national and municipal levels gained strength, having more and more of an influence on urban planning. At the municipal elections, held in October 2012, the political group that had governed Curitiba for decades was replaced by a left-leaning political coalition.

The new political group controlling the municipal government, and the national strengthening of the concept of democratic management and therefore popular participation, would influence the planning process in Curitiba, including the opening to a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations and actors in its institutional arrangement.

2.3.2   Contextualization of the Institutional Arrangements in the 2004 and 2014 Curitiba Master Plan processes

The 2004 Master Plan, Municipal Law 11.266/2004, brings Curitiba into compliance with the City Statute, Federal Law 10257/01, and complements the guidelines established in the 1966 Master Plan (Curitiba, 2004). Following the planning practices in the city, this plan was developed by IPPUC planning professionals and specific stakeholders between closed doors, corresponding to the informal agreements established in Curitiba.

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[3] A non-governmental organization comprised of 26 entities (social movements, trade unions, organizations, collectives, and citizens) with the objective of monitoring, proposing, and overseeing the content and processes related to the Curitiba Master plan.

The institutional arrangement of the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan was composed of few stakeholders representing governmental organizations, universities, councilmen, and key economic sectors such as real estate, industry, transport, and construction. The population was present with a significantly lower number of representatives. During the development of this plan, nine public hearings were held by IPPUC, and some presentations were delivered only to partnering segments. Most part of the public events happened in weekday nights and only in venues in the city center, making the participation of the working class living in the suburbs difficult. It seemed like a technocratic approach disguised as a participatory process.

From the 142 amendments proposed during the public events, only two were included in the draft law forwarded to the city council (IPPUC, 2004). With the involvement of approximately 1,500 people throughout the process, the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan was unanimously approved by the city council, where political opposition was a tiny minority (Moura, 2014). The Master Plan ended up being too general, requiring specific regulations and sectorial plans to be made later on. As an advocate group put it, "because it is a law which refers to a number of regulations, its impact on the urban reality depended on the quality of supplementary laws and how participatory processes occur for it to be improved" (Mobiliza, 2014: 4). The specific regulations and sectorial plans were also done behind closed doors, by IPPUC planning professionals and the same selected stakeholders, without proper public discussions.

Ten years later, the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process (Municipal Law 14.771/2015) occurred through a substantially more complex institutional arrangement (Table 03). Regarding the formal institutions, in addition to those presented in 2004, new federal, state, and municipal urban legislations fostered by the City Statute played a key role in the process. With respect to the actors and organizations, new representatives, mostly related to non-governmental sectors, participated in the 2014 arrangement.

Table 03 - Organizations and Actors in the Institutional Arrangement of the 2004 and 2014 Master Plan: featured items

Organizations and Actors - 2004	Organizations and Actors - 2014
- Curitiba Research and Urban Planning Institute, IPPUC;	- Curitiba Research and Urban Planning Institute, IPPUC;
- Federation of Industries of Paraná, FIEP;	- Federation of Industries of Paraná, FIEP;
- Relevant business sector (housing, transport, public works);	- Relevant business sector (housing, transport, public works);
- Brazilian Lawyers Association, OAB;	- Brazilian Lawyers Association, OAB;
- Universities;	- Universities;
- Urban Planning and Public Works Commission;	- Urban Planning and Public Works Commission;
- City Council;	- City Council;
- State of Paraná Construction Industry Union, SINDUSCON/PR;	- State of Paraná Construction Industry Union, SINDUSCON/PR;
- Paraná Commercial Organization, ACP	- Paraná Commercial Organization, ACP
- Neighborhood associations;	- Neighborhood associations;
- IPPUC Advisory Council, CONSECON;	
	- City Council City Planning Commission
	- Curitiba City Commission - Concitiba;
	- SENGE/PR – State of Paraná Union of Engineers
	- SINDARQ/PR – State of Paraná Union of Architects
	- CAUPR – Architecture and Urban Planning Council of Paraná
	- Mobiliza – Non-governmental organization
	- National Housing Struggle Movement
	- National Movement for the Curitiba Homeless Population
	- Popular Transport Front
	- Curitiba Master Plan Forum
	- Urban Planning and Public Works Commission;

Source: Author, 2015.

The informal institutions presented in the 2014 institutional arrangement showed simultaneously inertia in the way IPPUC conducted the process with some key

stakeholders, and a higher popular participation. Once the process began, organized civil society got mobilized, considering that the elaboration of the new Master Plan could not be merely seen as a formal requirement, given the real needs of the city, which would justify radical changes in the urban planning process and the city management. Thus, if in 2004 the civil society had been deprecated in the arrangement, in 2014 it was the segment with the highest number of representatives.

During the 2014 process, IPPUC and the Curitiba City Commission (Concitiba) held 91 public and private events related to the development of the plan, and independent groups held another 12 workshops. As stated in official documents, a total of 6,305 people were involved in the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process (Concitiba, 2015).

However, despite the increase in the number of participants in all these events, critics pointed out that moments of open discussions were rare. "They kept the IPPUC way of organizing participatory forums, which do not allow active contributions" (Interviewed 01). As reported by the respondent 08, there was no debate, discussion and neither popular deliberation.

Not even a substantial pressure demanding for more participation coming from non-governmental organizations and key actors from civil society was able to overcome the arbitrary conduction of IPPUC during the process. Therefore, despite a more democratic composition of the institutional arrangement, the way the 2014 Master Plan process was conducted reinforces the role of informal institutions: norms, practices and planning habits that put specific stakeholders close to IPPUC in privileged positions when deciding what to be included in the final planning documents. According to some respondents, the content of the Master Plan was defined by political forces that are long established in the city, which are mainly related to the real state and public transport sectors. As put by Interviewee 3, "there is a historical way of doing things that led us to take a particular procedure" during the planning process.

Feeling deprecated in the IPPUC process, several organizations and civil groups went to the city council in order to propose amendments to the Master Plan draft. In the events held by the city council, different stakeholders participated and proposed 223 amendments to the Master Plan. These amendments were voted in twelve sessions, and 61% of the amendments were incorporated in the final draft of the plan (City Council of Curitiba, 2015).

However, despite the number of people and variety of organizations and actors participating in the public hearings and presenting suggestions, two questions remained: How different the 2004 and 2014 planning processes actually were? And how the different institutional arrangements are reflected in the respective Master Plans?

2.4 Reflections of Institutional Arrangements in Curitiba: A Comparative Analysis Based on the Theoretical Framework

As previously mentioned in this paper, there is a considerable difference between the institutional arrangement of the 2004 and 2014 Curitiba Master Plans. In the 2004 process, the institutional arrangement was composed of few stakeholders, mainly consisting of governmental organizations, universities and the business sector. In the 2014 process, the institutional arrangement incorporated a variety of new governmental but also non-governmental actors and organizations.

This increase of stakeholders in the 2014 institutional arrangement can be explained by the municipal elections and the national context, which brought to the table new informal institutions related to the democratization of urban planning and management. As expressed by some respondents, people were expecting an open and transparent process, with a wide participation (Interviewees 1, 2, 6, 8 and 10). As discussed by Clemens (2010), existing institutions might be destabilized by the institutionalization of new conventions for political actions. Institutions that no longer correspond to the collective shared behavior or beliefs tend to be replaced or reframed (Tsebelis, 1998; Aoki, 2007). Indeed, the nationwide manifestations occurred in 2013 demanded more public participation, resulting in a substantial popular engagement in the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process.

However, despite the differences related to the composition of the 2004 and 2014 institutional arrangements, most of the respondents considered that the openness to interact, discuss and negotiate during the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process had actually been restricted to the same stakeholders which took control of the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan process. The more advanced level of participation, such as "negotiation and co-decision" (where decision making is done among partners who are co-owners of a decision-making power) (Vodoz, 2013) remained reserved to business groups and municipal authorities.

Regarding the methods adopted in Curitiba throughout its planning history, Moura (2014: 3) considers that "the accommodation of the dominant interests around a technically-materialized political proposal has come to permit the consolidation of a hegemonic project and ensuring the internal conditions to support the model".

According to Hodgson (2006), by reproducing shared habits, organizations create strong mechanisms of conformity and regulatory agreements. Once a habit is continually reconfirmed and reproduced through relevant and strategic actors and organizations, it became an informal institution, influencing the behavior and the interaction among stakeholders (Aoki, 2007).Therefore, although at first the city hall had emphasized that the development of the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan would be made through a collaborative process, the same informal institutions that directed the 2004 Master Plan process overcame the new informal institutions presented in the 2014 process. As explained by Interviewee 4, "In Curitiba there is a tradition in developing the urban planning processes in a closed way, with people who are aligned. And there is an intense effort by municipal management and some specific stakeholders to keep this going". As a result, despite numerous public hearings and stakeholders' engagement, both processes led to the same restrict interactions. As reported by some respondents, few business organizations and actors are the ones determining the city development in close and opaque relation to the municipal authorities and professionals, as practiced for decades in the city.

Regarding the content of the plan, although the high number of amendments included in the final draft, the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan is considered by most of the respondents as general as the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan, diminishing the importance of resolutions taken democratically, once the implementation phase might negate them later. Comparing both plans, there are few and specific improvements in the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan, which are related to housing (new social housing policies and taxation of underutilized properties were included, i.e.); regularization of land ownership; and urban mobility (public transport policies, and reduction of parking spaces in single-family dwellings built along the main bus routes). Thus, the inclusion of amendments does not mean necessarily a higher quality plan.

According to the advocacy group Terra de Direitos (2015: 2), the new plan "advances in some points, corrects some conceptual defects, includes some topics that were absent (...) [but] continues to be general, emptied of applicability. Again, it takes the

decision about the conformation of the territory to urban policy and socio-spatial justice outside of the plan". Similar to the 2004 plan, the implementation of the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan also depends on specific laws, instruments, and sectoral policies, which are still open to this date.

These evidences seem to prove the consideration of Clemens (2010), according to whom new institutional arrangements might change the course of processes, although not necessarily the content of their results. In other words, changes in the urban planning system/institutional arrangements are not sufficient to achieve transformation in the final products of the planning processes (Healey, 2006). For more inclusive and democratic developments and results, it is also necessary a cultural change related to the interactive qualities of the processes (Healey, 2006).

2.5 Conclusion

The analysis of the composition of the institutional arrangements in the processes of drafting the 2004 and 2014 Curitiba Master Plans showed that the old technocratic arrangement shifted to a more collaborative one. This transition was formally brought about through the inclusion of numerous and new civil society representatives, and the results of this process were partially included in the plan.

However, despite a series of public hearings intended to bring about popular participation in drafting the plan, the informal institutions that perpetuate planning habits in Curitiba (such as a more intense deliberative participation restricted to the traditional and technocratic elites of Curitiba) remained in the new institutional arrangement, blocking substantial breakthroughs.

Moreover, although advances can be verified in some topics of the 2014 Master Plan, mainly resulting from the mobilization of civil society, the plan was extremely general, therefore unable to guide the development of Curitiba. Once again, specific regulations, laws, and policies, would be defined afterwards, putting aside the principles of collaborative governance.

Despite the criticisms regarding the final quality of the plan, as well as the obscurity presented in the development of the process, the elaboration of the 2014 Master Plan of Curitiba is seen as emblematic, given the constant and intense pressure from civil society

on the municipal administration, revealing a transformation in the importance that people attribute to participatory processes. This finding suggests that the democratic composition of an institutional arrangement can be the first step of a gradual transformation process to the development of a collaborative culture that leads to plans developed collectively.

Appendices

Appendix 01 - Selection of Respondents

PROFILE OF RESPONDENT	SEGMENT	ORGANIZATION OF THE RESPONDENT	REPRESENTATIVE	ROLE IN THE PROCESS
Governmental organizations	Public Sector			
Non-governmental organizations	Social Movements and Popular Organizations			
Academia, press, civil society	Academia			
	Press			
	Civil society			

Source: Author, 2015

3 PAPER 02: INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN URBAN PLANNING: THE CASE OF CURITIBA, BRAZIL

Abstract: A process is recognized as collaborative when it demonstrates the involvement of multiple stakeholders who are mobilized to interact and negotiate horizontally in order to achieve a collective consensus and common objectives. Although efforts can be made to make a process collaborative, a governance process is situated in particular histories and geographies, and collectively shared values, cultures, norms and behaviors can help or hinder the emergence of inclusive democratic practices. Because of a shift in the institutional arrangement of planning in Curitiba, the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan was developed within a more democratic framework, with the engagement of several governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations. However, this plan is as general as the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan it replaced, which was proposed within a technocratic framework. If the 2004 and 2014 institutional arrangements and processes were so different, why did they achieve similar results? This study investigates which elements influence the maintenance of established practices in urban planning processes. The basic assumption is that the final product of a planning process is heavily influenced by existing institutions. The evidence presented in this study shows that path dependence on ideas, behaviors and actions perpetuated practices that have been established in the urban planning of Curitiba for decades.

3.1 Introduction

The city of Curitiba is simultaneously an example and an exception as one of the few success cases of urban planning in Brazil, featuring a historical combination of rapid demographic urban growth, lack of clear and long-standing institutions related to cities, and a culture of political participation more marked by resistance and confrontation than collaboration between multiple social actors. This state capital in southern Brazil grew rapidly from the 1940s to the 1980s (today, it has a population of 2 million) and its mayors were appointed by the federal government during the military dictatorship. During this period, however, a group of politicians and urbanists envisioned and implemented an urban plan based on a close relationship between public transportation and land use that led to international recognition for the city. Besides the technical instruments of the urban plan, this group also established strong public planning organizations as well as political institutions that became ingrained in the local political scenario. Even after the democratization of Brazil in the 1980s and the passage of the City Statute on the national level in 2001 (largely the result of grassroots demands), the city continued to be governed by the same political group. When the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan was revised, the historically technocratic approach to planning was evident, despite the requirement of public participation in urban planning processes in the City Statute (Moura, 2014).

However, an institutional shift took place between the 2004 Master Plan and the new plan which was proposed in 2014. The political group that had governed the city for decades was replaced by a more left-leaning political group, and on the national level there was a strengthening of the concept of democratic management and with it, popular participation. In a stark contrast with previous planning processes, a number of institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations and actors participated in the 2014 debates.

One could say that the city was setting aside its technocratic approach and experimenting with governance models. Unlike government, governance looks at the interplay between state and civil society and the extent to which collective projects can be achieved through the participation of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders (Healey, 1997; Pierre, 2011). Governance implies plural and non-hierarchical management modes in which the role of the state is to encourage and to expand collaborative spaces (Healey, 1997; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Frey, 2007). Once the state ceases to be the sole

focal point of planning and decision making, interaction becomes the key element of governance among the stakeholders in collaborative processes.

Despite the new institutional arrangement, the 2014 Master Plan is as general as the 2004 Master Plan, which was proposed within a technocratic framework. If the 2004 and 2014 processes were so different, why did they achieve similar results? The objective of this study is to investigate the elements that affected the continuance of established practices in urban planning processes. This is even more interesting in cases where a shift was seen in the composition of the institutional arrangement. The basic assumption is that the final product of a planning process is heavily influenced by the existing institutions.

In order to explore the maintenance of technocratic practices in an institutional arrangement with a more democratic composition, a case study was conducted on the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process. Data is based on 10 semi-structured interviews with organizations and actors that played a prominent role in the 2014 planning process — some of whom were also involved in the 2004 process.

This paper is structured into five sections. The first section introduces the literature review, the methodology and the techniques used in the analysis. The second section presents the formal spaces in which the 2014 Master Plan was drafted. The third section presents the institutional arrangement related to the planning process, highlighting its composition and institutional context. The fourth section analyzes the process of collaborative governance in Curitiba through the lenses of the existing institutional arrangement, and is followed by the conclusion.

3.2 Literature Review

For a process to be recognized as collaborative, it must demonstrate the involvement of multiple stakeholders who are mobilized to interact and negotiate horizontally to achieve a collective consensus as well as common objectives (Healey, 1997; Gray, 2004; Schwarz, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012). Interaction and agreements among stakeholders are essential features of governance (Frey, 2007).

Although efforts can be made to make a process collaborative, a governance process is situated in particular histories and geographies, and collectively shared values, cultures, norms and behaviors can encourage or hinder its emergence (Healey, 1997).

These shared habits of thought and action (informal institutions), laws and regulations (formal institutions), and different governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations comprise the institutional arrangements (Souto-Maior & Gondim, 1992; Aoki, 2007). The set of possibilities that can be chosen in the present are strictly dependent on past choices and institutions, which correspond to the phenomenon of path dependence (North, 1991).

The institutional arrangement can help or hinder the emergence of inclusive democratic practices (Healey, 1997). Difficulties in implementing collaborative governance can arise from manipulation of the process by some stakeholders, a lack of commitment to cooperate, as well as uncertainty about the purpose of the process and distrust among the stakeholders (Gray, 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2007). Furthermore, inertia in bureaucratic organizations is one of the elements that can also impair the development of democratic processes (Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009).

Consequently, perceptions of the object and the involved parties held by those who comprise the institutional arrangement affect participation in planning processes (Souto-Maior & Gondim, 1992). Many authors describe these perceptions as frames (Benford & Snow, 2000; Kaufman, Elliott & Shmueli, 2003; Gray, 2004); in this study we will use the term *framing perspectives*, since this term conveys the notion that a frame is a perception. As stated by Clemens (2010), the repertoire of the institutional arrangement constituted by the experience and perception of those involved both reflects and forms their patterns of social organization.

The actors and organizations frame a process and the stakeholders from one perspective, granting them different meanings and different levels of interests and involvement (Kaufman, Elliott & Shmueli, 2003; Gray, 2004). Knowing the existing framing perspectives allows us to draw conclusions about how they affect the development of a process (Kaufman, Elliott & Shmueli, 2003). For collaboration to work, it is essential to construct a collective identity among the stakeholders. To do so, a change of framing perspectives (or reframing) must occur, resulting in alignment between individual and organizational perspectives (Gray, 2004).

Evaluations of collaborative processes have shown instances where traditional ways of urban planning persist under a mask of collaboration, where too little attention has been paid to basic inequalities within the institutional arrangement. In these contexts, little

collective negotiation is possible even after some years of governance regime (Healey, 1997).

Although developing or adapting institutional arrangements is crucial to achieve a more inclusive arena, this is not sufficient to guarantee negotiations between stakeholders (Healey, 1997). It is therefore important to establish some elements such as balance, trust, and transparency within the institutional arrangement to enable collaborative processes (Gray, 2004; Schwarz, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012).

3.3 Methodology

In order to investigate the influence existing institutions had on an institutional arrangement, we conducted a case study in Curitiba, where the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process achieved similar results as the 2004 process despite the new actors and organizations in the institutional arrangement.

The data derive from 10 semi-structured interviews that were conducted with organizations and actors involved in the planning process and/or urban development (see Appendix 02 – Selection of respondents). Key respondents were identified based on public hearing documents, media coverage, and recommendations from informants.

The semi-structured interview protocol was composed of 19 questions organized into five categories: i) the characteristics of the respondent; ii) institutional arrangement, framing perspectives and interactions among the stakeholders; iii) history of conflicts and mediations; iv) stakeholder involvement in the process; and v) stakeholder assessment of the process. Interviews, transcription, and qualitative analysis were conducted in 2015 and 2016.

3.4 Case Study

3.4.1 The 2014 Curitiba Master Plan and the formal spaces of the process

In Brazil, municipal master plans are to be revised every ten years with public participation (Brasil, 2001). Accordingly, in 2014 Curitiba began the process of revising the 2004 Master Plan.

The review of the Curitiba Master Plan was divided between the executive and legislative branches. The former was responsible for developing the instrument, and the latter for its voting and approval. In the executive branch, the organization responsible for guiding the process were IPPUC (the Curitiba Research and Urban Planning Institute), a municipal agency which is legally responsible for revising the master plan (IPPUC, 2014), and the Curitiba City Commission (Concitiba), a municipal collective agency for urban policy (Curitiba, 2014).

The initial public hearing took place in March 2014 and more than 300 people participated. Subsequently, 28 public events were held under the responsibility of IPPUC. The dialog between the population and IPPUC was conducted via Concitiba and the IPPUC website, where residents were able to leave their contributions and get more information about the process (IPPUC, 2014). The result of this stage was the first draft, which was submitted to Concitiba.

The first draft was discussed by different stakeholders in an expanded plenary session held by Concitiba and 47 amendments were incorporated, resulting in the second draft of the plan, which was subsequently submitted to the mayor (Concitiba, 2014). After evaluation, the mayor submitted the document to the Curitiba city council to be vote (Curitiba, 2015).

While this process was taking place in the executive branch, the city council held eight hearings to discuss the master plan. After the draft of the master plan was received, the city council organized four thematic workshops in which organizations and actors proposed 223 amendments. This was then followed by twelve public hearings, and 61% of the proposed amendments were approved. The final draft was submitted to the mayor in November 2015.

In December 2015, the mayor signed the Master Plan Law, and vetoed five of the 137 amendments which had been approved by the city council. The law took effect in February 2016, almost two years after the process began. As stated in an official document, "6,305 people from the community were involved in the debates around the review of the Curitiba Master Plan" (Concitiba, 2015:1), a process which is summarized in Figure 04 below:

Figure 04: 2014 Curitiba Master Plan formal process

Source: Author, 2016

3.5 Discussion

3.5.1 Conditions that predated the institutional arrangements

The characteristics of an institutional arrangement which already exist in a process of collaborative governance, such as historical conflicts or alliances and levels of trust that exist between the stakeholders, can facilitate or hinder collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007).

When the process of drafting the master plan began in 2014, there were two conflicting informal institutions in Curitiba. On the one hand, there was inertia in the technocratic and centralized way urban planning was conducted by IPPUC, which for a number of decades was considered the most important organization responsible for planning in the city. And on the other hand the City Statute of 2001 provided the right to public participation, which was strengthened by popular manifestations around the country in 2013 demanding improvements in urban planning.

Although a new political group with democratic discourse supported by leftist parties had taken over city administration, the mayor stated that the review of the master plan "is an important step, but there is no room for major changes" (*Gazeta do Povo*, 2014).

According to the respondents in this study, for non-governmental organizations which were hoping for deliberative participation that would have resulted in a technically

detailed plan, the mayor's statement added to the uncertainties surrounding the stakeholders. As stated by Interviewee 8,

> I couldn't understand. The mayor was elected to make changes, because there had been one political group managing the city for 20 years, giving directions for planning. And he said the goal was to resist (...). Someone is being deceived here.

For business organizations, hearing that there was no room for major changes was reassuring, since they expected they would continue to have a privileged role in the process, with spaces to interact and negotiate with government organizations (Interviewees 7, 9).

IPPUC endorsed the words of the mayor and began the process with the expectation that it was the "fulfillment of a rite" (Interviewee 3) and also that the "process would be educational".

Particularly given the different initial expectations, the mayor's statement sowed distrust and fragility in the relationships within the institutional arrangement, strengthening antagonism among the framing perspectives.

The revision of the master plan began within this context, maintaining procedures faithful to the informal planning institutions in Curitiba. As Interviewee 10 observed, "it is important for us to see how these authoritarian tactics by IPPUC are still in line with its origin" under the military dictatorship.

3.5.2   The board and the players

The process of drafting the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan was undertaken through a substantially more complex institutional arrangement than the 2004 process, one which involved four times as many stakeholders, particularly non-governmental organizations. As for the informal institutions, the traditional mental models which were shared and reproduced by public organizations and the business sector coexisted alongside new informal institutions arising from the empowerment of non-governmental organizations and actors.

As a reflection of these mental models which have traditionally been shared in Curitiba, the business sector embodied the framing perspective that "in fact, in practice,

who ends up making the master plan are the entrepreneurs, because they are the ones who build the city" (Interviewee 9), and this notion was seen to reverberate in municipal management. Proof of this can be seen in the fact that IPPUC sought and informally received stakeholders from the business sector to discuss demands and proposals which were constructed in exclusive meetings and later incorporated into the plan. This closeness was classified as "natural" by the business community (Interviewee 9). The same phenomenon was seen in the city council, which sought out business organizations to receive proposals from this sector (Interviewee 7). This subsequently influenced the process of political connection of interests, especially with regard to decisions on the amendments to the draft law for the master plan (Interviewee 5).

These interactions restricted to these stakeholders constitute interdependencies between the business sector, IPPUC, and the city council. For some authors (Agranoff, 2006; O'Brien, 2012), it is important that those involved in collaborative governance processes be interdependent. According to Ansell and Gash (2007), interdependence promotes the desire to participate and a significant commitment to collaboration so that those who are involved agree to prioritize collectively agreed objectives and abandon potential unilateral gains (Vodoz, 2013). In addition, interdependence between stakeholders strengthens information sharing between them and provides mutual control and sanction during the process. The greater the interdependence, the greater the need for collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009).

But moving away from the ideas of these authors, we can consider that the presence of interdependencies may favor only those parties which are directly involved in these relationships. In these cases, interdependence may only strengthen the existing informal institutions and benefit only a few of those involved, to the detriment of the institutional arrangement as a whole.

In Curitiba, informally institutionalized interdependencies perpetuated the elevated position of business interests over popular concerns and added to asymmetries of power, distrust, and fragmentation in the institutional arrangement. This is in line with the reflection that in proceedings containing strong informal institutions, interdependence is only unilaterally positive for those directly interdependent entities, and compromises the success of spaces that should be collectively collaborative.

As stated by Interviewee 8, "there was clearly an alignment between business organizations or those which are recognized as conservative in Curitiba like ACP[4] and city hall, and between the organizations represented by the unions and by civil society". This situation fostered the different framing perspectives and affected the relationship between the parties involved and, consequently, the development of the process.

If on the one hand entrepreneurs had established a horizontal relationship with IPPUC, the relationship between the other civil society stakeholders with the institute was clearly vertical/hierarchical. Furthermore, statements from the respondents claim that the population not only did not have the right of expression, but was "scorned, ridiculed, or repressed" by the IPPUC staff at the public hearings and in the expanded Concitiba plenary session (Interviewees 4, 7, 9, and 10).

Schwarz (2006) explains that one hindrance to collaboration is the need to adjust framing perspectives. For this author, collaboration requires the involved parties to abandon preconceived frameworks in order to maximize collaboration. Consequently, encouraging participants to reconsider the perceptions or assumptions on which they base their concepts of policy is crucial for collaborative governance (O´Brien, 2012). Although reframing is crucial, it did not occur in Curitiba and antagonistic frameworks persisted throughout the entire process.

Imbalances in knowledge, representativeness, or resources for participation are other elements that affect the way in which different stakeholders are involved, as well as the intensity of this involvement (Gray, 2004). In these cases the process will be prone to manipulation by stronger groups and will affect incentives for collaboration, requiring strategies that empower weaker groups (Ansell & Gash, 2007).

In the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process, asymmetries of power were present in the coexistence of horizontal relations (between the business sector and the executive and legislative branches of government) and vertical relations (between the other segments of the civil society and the executive and legislative branches of government), as well as in the level of knowledge among the parties involved. Although Interviewee 3 classifies the population's knowledge about the master plan as low and consequently claims that the process was intended to be conducted in an educational environment, the 10 regional

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[4] ACP: Paraná Commercial Organization, founded in 1890.

training workshops promoted by IPPUC were not carried out through a methodology that could qualify the participants.

Reported in some respondents,

> the community training meetings were one of the most ridiculous things I've ever seen. It was a decoy. There was no training at all. Nobody came out of that meeting knowing what the master plan was, or what they were doing there.
> (Interviewee 8).

> IPPUC showed up at these public hearings and delivered a booklet, a little thing that was very difficult to understand and did not capture people's attention.
> (Interviewee 10).

As stated by half of the respondents, some civil society organizations held informal workshops in order to empower the participants. "These spaces created a sense of trust, a sense of importance in the discussion" (Interviewee 10). But these meetings did not reach everyone involved. Consequently, low ownership and knowledge about the process among the population combined with IPPUC's repellent posture to make it difficult for this group to contribute during the process.

3.5.3   The game and behind the scenes

As stated, expectations for the process diverged significantly among those involved. For the population, the participatory process was meant to encourage broad participation, with actual openings, "and not simply fulfill rites or protocols for public hearings" (Interviewee 1). Meanwhile, the municipal administration behavior was based on the idea that "there is a process of direct participation and a process of representation" (Interviewee 3). This understanding was reflected in the imposition of fragile and indirect channels of communication with the population, as well in the "educational" classification that IPPUC assigned to the process.

Although collaborative approaches can be designated by legislative bodies, participation by stakeholders tends to be voluntary (Ansell & Gash, 2007). For this reason, it is important that the public administration mobilize intensely and urge civil society to participate (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011).

Precisely because of the diverse character within institutional arrangements in collaborative governance, the presence of a mediator who can help establish a new

collective value and change pre-existing systems can be fundamental (O´Brien, 2012). The mediator might emerge from the institutional arrangement itself or be an external actor or organization. The mediator is substantially neutral and remains above the existing disputes in the institutional arrangement, seeking transparency in the process and helping identify and visualize problems to be solved (Ansell & Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012).

None of the interviewees identified anyone who exercised this role of mediator in the Curitiba process. The process of drafting the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan lacked negotiation in the channels of communication which were imposed, was devoid of mediation between the different framing perspectives, and also lacked the construction of a collective understanding or establishment of collective goals.

Despite the diversity of the institutional arrangement, there was no concern with establishing a collective consensus. As reported by some respondents, there were common themes for all stakeholders, such as mobility, housing, and land regularization. However, these issues resulted in different objectives and goals, which were maintained in the absence of mediation that would have resulted in a shared understanding. "The work was done with different goals, objectives, and policies for different groups" (Interviewee 3).

Another factor that determines the effectiveness of collaborative governance is the collective construction of methodology by the involved parties so that they feel legitimized in the process (Souto-Maior & Gondim, 1992; Ansell & Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012). In Curitiba, six of the ten respondents claimed that the methodology for revising the master plan in 2014 was imposed, and that it was too rigid, technical, and difficult to understand and absorb. "The difficulties in participating were created in a variety of ways, and the stipulation of the methodology hampered effective participation" (Interviewee 8).

The rigid format established for the process was also pointedly criticized by the interviewees. Many of the respondents claimed that despite the numerous events and public hearings which were conducted, the demarcated spaces and IPPUC's resistance effectively prevented the population from participating, excluding possibilities for discussion and debate of ideas.

The lack of transparency and clarity surrounding the rules of the process also received criticism. Both are essential in collaborative governance because they permit the involved parties to be sure that they have all the information about the process (Frey,

2007; Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009; O'Brien, 2012; Vodoz, 2013), and they also encourage joint projection of the steps and help reduce conflicts (Schwarz, 2006).

In contrast with the understanding of these authors, according to Interviewee 2, "the process was muddled. No one knew what the process would be like or how it would end". It was not even clear which elements would be addressed. As the media reported, "the debate, which should extend until the end of the year, was launched yesterday, but was not accompanied by details about the points to be reviewed" (*Gazeta do Povo*, 2014).

Although IPPUC states that it widely distributed the information needed for the stakeholders to participate, six of the ten respondents complained that the organization did not provide its diagnosis, its proposals, or its draft bill for discussion in the public hearings.

As a result, non-governmental organizations and actors incessantly demanded that more collaborative spaces be provided, resulting in an environment of intense pressure for the municipal administration. "I think IPPUC didn't expect so much demand from people wanting to participate" (Interviewee 2).

As a result of this pressure, IPPUC revised some of its procedures. According to Interviewee 2, "if we hadn't been there, the process would have been different." This is because,

> firstly, we were very critical. So much so that after the first hearing we scheduled a conversation with IPPUC to say that we would not accept the way that the process was being conducted. That was not a participatory process. And from there they tried to adapt [the process] significantly to our criticism. Of course, we wanted much more, but the dialog we managed to create with them, not because of them but because the media decided to follow this agenda and our criticism became a story in the regional newspaper *Gazeta do Povo*, meant that they immediately wanted to take action.
> (Interviewee 2).

But even so, many things were maintained. IPPUC continued to not provide information at the public hearings, and the business entities also did not present their proposals openly in public hearings, instead delivering them directly to IPPUC and the city council (Interviewee 10). As a result, the discussions in the public hearings were vague. "People said things no one was for or against" (Interviewee 10).

The numerous internal fissures in the institutional arrangement were reflected in how the process was conducted as well as its end product. While IPPUC defended creating a

general master plan, civil society wanted a more technically detailed master plan with practical provisions (Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10). Interviewee 3 admitted that the general nature of the master plan was intentional.

> We received a lot of criticism about the limits and depth of the master plan. We understand that we couldn't delve too deep in an educational process, entering into land use and occupation legislation or subdivisions, for example. We dealt with the general framework.
> (Interviewee 3).

The meetings held in Concitiba (whose president and substitute are required to come from IPPUC) also followed a rigid format, and were held at times that made it difficult for most members to participate and guaranteed that the majority of attendees were always from city hall[5]. Not even the counselors of Concitiba had access to the IPPUC projects. "The discussions involved drafting, technique, and not the political will, the real goals for the city" (Interviewee 8).

One of the counselors stated that after attending some of the Concitiba meetings, he decided to stop participating. "They act in such a way as to impede public participation. The entire methodology is geared toward validating the will of economic and technocratic power. The process is flawed from the beginning. They organize themselves in such a way as to discount any criticism that might arise" (*Gazeta do Povo*, 2015).

As for the process of voting on the amendments made to the draft bill during the expanded Concitiba plenary session, it was not even clear to the business representative (Interviewee 7). For Interviewee 1, the expanded Concitiba plenary session was emblematic. "Honestly, it was a moment of maneuvering, of guaranteeing what had been technically produced by IPPUC. Of making it pass without major interference" (Interviewee 1). Similarly, for Interviewee 8 "the expanded plenary session is a lie. The people clap, some advances are lost, but it's irrelevant since this is not the law that goes to the mayor".

Alongside Concitiba and the formal environments of the process there were discussion groups composed of professionals from the city hall and from IPPUC which

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[5] Art. 3º § 5º The function of city councilor will be voluntary and unpaid, considered a relevant public service for legal purposes and may be suspended for reasons of public interest or because of the councilor's absence in a procedurally regulated manner (Law Nº 14314/2013 which amends Law Nº12579/2007).

discussed themes and projects that later resulted in the draft of the master plan. "It was this law, which was made in the professional groups restricted to the city government, that went to the city council to be vote" (Interviewee 8).

> The political force revealed in the city government's professional groups does not correspond with the force of Concitiba or even the force of the city council. These are forces that have been consolidated over decades, that act on real state speculation and public transportation. That is where the decisions were made (Interviewee 8).

For most of the respondents, the process which took place in the city council was more dynamic and democratic, even though it also was not deliberative. For Interviewee 10, the process in the legislative branch "was very open, even from the point of view of mediation. There was a more generous time for us to talk and for us to swap ideas. The city council provided a much larger space for this interaction between entities. In the city council "was when society could talk" (Interviewee 7).

Since the draft bill "had been made in a unilateral, anti-democratic, technocratic manner," explains Interviewee 8, "everyone wanted to state their opinion! We still haven't given our opinion!" Since they did not feel legitimized in the executive process, the population approached the city council believing that its demands could be incorporated into the draft bill through amendments (Interviewee 1).

The decision about the possibility of amending the draft bill was another moment of intense conflict with opposition from IPPUC. Consequently, described Interviewee 5, there was a large amount of pressure on the IPPUC professionals for the legislative branch to not alter what had been created by the executive branch. For this respondent, "the ego of IPPUC made it difficult to propose new things. There was a process of dispute between the executive and legislative branches" (Interviewee 5).

Although the legislative process was judged more democratic than the one promoted by the executive branch, the city council also followed the tradition of political negotiations. In an attempt to justify the choice of amendments, Interviewee 5 argued that "you end up having to choose which themes to work on for this to become an amendment. Society went to the city council chamber, but was not allowed to deliberate. It was the councilmen who presented and voted on the proposals of society" in a politically arbitrary manner.

As a result, what determined the decision on a particular amendment was the political relationship its author had with the councilmen. Interviewee 9 set the tone for this stage by revealing that "during the drafting process, it was the city council [stage] that was the most intense exchange, nearly daily, between us and the councilmen, for discussion, visits, review". Along similar lines, the "ACP commission drafted a document with proposals. This document was presented to the city council at ACP headquarters" (Interviewee 7).

Put into context by Interviewee 8, "the councilmen just have to be fed. They exchange a problem for a favor. So some amendments are planted, to be withdrawn later in return for a favor". These political negotiations determined the phrasing of the draft law by the legislature with amendments added at the last minute and no prior discussion in the formal spaces of the legislative process, to the benefit of the real estate market (Interviewee 1).

By the end of the process, eight of the ten respondents believed that most of their proposals were included in the plan, although superficially. The real state segment stood out with between 60% and 70% of its proposals incorporated (Interviewee 9).

Therefore, even if there was an imbalance of power also in the city council, the draft law was sent to the mayor with a content that differed remarkably from the original document prepared by IPPUC. "Do you know how many amendments were proposed? 223. Do you think a well-crafted law can have so many amendments? If it represented the city's political forces, it would have not had so many amendments" (Interviewee 10).

3.5.4   Failures and controversies in the story

Manipulation of the process by stronger actors and/or organizations, lack of a real commitment to collaboration on the part of governmental organizations, and distrust between the stakeholders are some of the difficulties to the effectiveness of collaborative governance (Gray, 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2007). In addition, collaborative initiatives and identifying common goals between the involved parties are hampered by the lack of approaches that encourage new framing perspectives (Gray, 2004).

The role of a mediator as a catalyst tends to create the means and spaces for collaboration, facilitating consensus on decisions to be made (O'Brien, 2012). The

absence of a mediator in the process of drafting the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan may be one reason why reframing and conflict mediation did not take place.

Building trust between stakeholders in an institutional arrangement is related to promoting participant engagement (O'Brien, 2012). In the case of Curitiba, this engagement only occurred between the parties whose interdependence is informally institutionalized, contributing to the adversarial environment where the process took place.

In addition to these issues, Kapucu, Yuldashev and Barkiev (2009) point to inertia in bureaucratic organizations as one of the elements that impair the development of democratic processes. In fact, the inertia in IPPUC's technocratic planning, linked to the maintenance of informal institutions present in Curitiba, determined the centralized format in which the 2014 Master Plan was drafted, and perpetuated the influence that the political relationship between governmental organizations and business sector exerts on the decisions and provisions of city planning. Consequently, even though numerous events and public hearings were held, the established format prevented the population from truly participating.

In collaborative governance, it is crucial that the proposals arising from the process be incorporated into the end product. This is one of the elements that signals the success of the process (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011; Vodoz, 2013). However, despite the substantial number of amendments which were incorporated, the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan is as generic as the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan, and also depends on specific laws for its implementation (Interviewees, 1, 2, 4, 8, and 10). Thus, "both the expectation of greater openness to participation as well as more technical detailing in the plan were dashed" (Interviewee 1). This assessment seems to prove the assertion by Clemens (2010: 50) that "(...) the very process of challenging institutions can change the rules of political action, although not necessarily the content of their results".

Despite the importance of multiple discussion forums, the success of collaborative governance also depends on having an exclusive forum for decision making (Ansell, Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012). If we consider only this condition, the process which took place in Curitiba was a failure. This is because, based on the analysis and interviews, at least 4 decision making spaces could be identified: two formal spaces (public hearings of the executive and legislative branches) and two informal spaces (informal meetings between the business sector, IPPUC, and the councilmen, and the meetings between the

professionals of the city hall and IPPUC). The statements mentioned earlier indicate that the 2014 Master Plan Law was constructed, above all, through the discussions and decisions which occurred in these informal spaces.

When asked to assess the process, the respondents were divided. Some of them stated it was i) a success, since they had never seen a process as participatory as this one (Interviewees 3, 5, 6, and 9); ii) a failure, mainly because of the limits on participation and the general nature of the final product (Interviewees, 1, 4, 8, and 10), or iii) some of them were undecided (Interviewees 2, 7).

In fact, the final results of a collaborative forum will be questioned if the actors and organizations that comprise the institutional arrangement believe that they were not able to participate (Ansell & Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012). Consequently, only the groups that felt legitimized in participating are likely to validate the process.

Interviewee 8 summarizes the dichotomous assessment of the respondents as follows:

> It was a success for the conservatives, for the technocracy. For democracy, for popular participation and even for institutional democracy, it was a complete disaster. It is absurd that 25 years after the democratic federal constitution we still have this type of procedure. We still need to democratize the city.

At the same time, these considerations stress that although it was full of flaws, the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process was emblematic. The constant and intense pressure from civil society on the municipal administration revealed the population's transformation, particularly with regard to its mobilization. In the words of Interviewee 1, "there is indeed an organized civil society, it is indeed interested in participating, and it is getting ready to debate. Things have changed in this sense."

However, although this transformation in the institutional arrangement in Curitiba is undeniable, only IPPUC believes that the way in which the process occurred helped develop a collaborative culture in the city. To create and sustain a collaborative culture, changes in two iterative factors (among other elements) are necessary: (1) the dialogs through which people interact, and (2) the structures that shape these interactions (Schwarz, 2006).

For Interviewee 5, developing a collaborative culture in Curitiba is conditional upon implementation of the plan. For Interviewee 2, frustration was very intense among groups that had very real demands, and since there was no space for discussion and deliberation, he concluded that "it is much easier to argue in other spheres than there [in the public spaces set aside for the process]". In the words of Interviewee 8, "it was useful for learning among civil society, but for practical purposes, for formulating public policy, it was a zero".

3.6 Conclusion

The institutional arrangement of urban planning in Curitiba moved from a technocratic composition, which was present in the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan process, to a more democratic composition, which was present in the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process. This transformation was evident in the inclusion and participation of various non-governmental actors and organizations in the process, and in the partial inclusion of some proposals within the Master Plan. However, the greater openness of participation and negotiation with certain stakeholders showed the presence of established informal institutions in the new institutional arrangement.

This finding shows that although a series of public events took place in the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process, informal institutions that perpetuate planning habits in Curitiba and some organizations that are strongly rooted in the municipal context prevented substantial advances in city planning from taking place. Therefore, participation was seen to be promoted in a quantitative and not qualitative manner. This analysis corresponds to the phenomenon of path dependence, in which previously established ideas and behaviors result in a set of patterns that determine opportunities and actions in the present (North, 1991).

Nevertheless, the low levels of trust between the stakeholders, the imbalances of power in the institutional arrangement and the lack of a mediator to connect different framing perspectives, which are fundamental elements in processes of collaborative governance, led to a weak collaboration (Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009; O'Brien, 2012). These difficulties were intensified by the simultaneous existence of different discussion forums. As Ansell & Gash (2007) and O'Brien (2012) warn, multiple forums may weaken the unity of the institutional arrangement, to the extent that actors and organizations are divided to occupy different spaces in the process.

Finally, although the composition of the institutional arrangement was diversified, informally institutionalized interdependent relations resulted in a product which was prepared in informal spaces, intended to favor certain stakeholders. For Tsebelis (1998), stakeholders do not necessarily try to modify institutions that may determine a disadvantageous outcome for them. On the contrary, they continue to work within the same institutional framework, hoping that external conditions will act on their behalf. Only after a series of failures is it likely that the political institution will be questioned.

These findings confirm our hypothesis by showing that the result of collaborative governance is a direct consequence of the relationships between organizations and actors, strengthened by existing institutions. Thus, even if the institutional arrangement is composed of various actors and organizations, the absence of neutral elements that can promote balance between the stakeholders and promote a collaborative environment can prevent the development of a collective construction. In these cases, the process may be manipulated, and the final product may be vulnerable to existing imbalances of power in the institutional arrangement, and will only address the interests of those who are routinely invited to collaborate.

Appendices

Appendix 02 - Selection of Respondents

PROFILE OF RESPONDENT	SEGMENT	ORGANIZATION OF THE RESPONDENT	REPRESENTATIVE	ROLE IN THE PROCESS
Governmental organizations	Public Sector			
Non-governmental organizations	Social Movements and Popular Organizations			
Academia, press, civil society	Academia			
	Press			
	Civil society			

Source: Author, 2015

4   PAPER 03: FALSE PRETENSIONS IN COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE: PATTERNS OF INTERACTION IN CURITIBA AND MONTREAL

Abstract: The practice of collaborative governance in urban planning stems from the idea that governments, civil society and private organizations engage in collective policy-making processes. Although the deliberative aspect and the role of a mediator have been identified as key components of collaborative governance, the interactive and retroactive processes, however, remain elusive. Which structures and processes facilitate or hinder the deliberative dimension of collaborative governance? This research is based on two case studies of two planning processes that were carried out in Curitiba (Brazil) and Montreal (Canada) in 2014-2015. Despite their different cultures of urban planning and management, their structures and processes reveal significant commonalities, namely the varying extent of collaborative interactions amongst stakeholders, according to the type of actors and organizations involved, as well as the arena and phase of the planning process. Although the processes and organisations responsible for the public hearing phase of planning differed in nature and composition, they both proved unconducive to collaborative governance in these particular cases. Whereas the resilience of informal institutions undermined the success of the democratic planning reform in Curitiba, it is the consultation fatigue and the type of planning document that explains the lack of participation in Montreal. These findings suggest that the planning regime as a whole, including the metropolitan, regional and local plans in addition to their regulatory systems, ought to be considered in order to qualify the extent of collaboration between planning authorities and stakeholders within each region. Moreover, the evidence presented in this study demonstrates that the communication message, a function of the political context and governance system, constitutes a potentially useful political and planning tool for the stimulation or maintenance of public participation, which highlights the significant role of planners and elected officials in the communication of planning objectives, the instigation of collaborative endeavours and in the improvement of public participation, both in terms of quantity and substance.

Keywords: Collaborative governance; Urban planning; Curitiba; Montreal.

4.1 Introduction

By integrating contributions from public and private stakeholders, the application of collaborative governance practices in urban planning should theoretically enable plans and policies to prevent and overcome technical and economic issues whilst providing a platform for the representation of collective concerns (Healey, 1997). Collaborative processes can also contribute in building partnerships and alliances between civil society and governments, and improve planning capacities. Achieving the anticipated outcomes from the implementation of this approach does not merely depend on consensus building, which requires negotiated approaches amongst stakeholders and intentional efforts to maximize collective mutual gains (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987), but more critically on the establishment of alliances that improve long-term relationships and ensure accountability (Weir, Rongerude, Ansell, 2008). The virtues of collaborative governance gave rise to a number of collaborative planning exercises (Healey, 2006), and the terms "partnering", "public participation", "visioning" and "co-construction" emerged as appealing alternatives to standard "public consultations" or "public hearings", which are often associated with legislative/regulatory processes.

Interactions, dialogues, discursive practices, negotiations and conflict-management are at the heart of collaborative processes. Participants must recognize their interdependencies, grant each other mutual respect, listen to others and be open to negotiating their positions. In fact, for collaboration to work, an alignment between stakeholders' interests and perspectives must occur (Gray, 2004), and these adaptations can help resolve disagreements (Kaufman, Elliott, Shmueli, 2003). Over time, new positions and frames of reference emerge, agreements are reached and interventions are generated (Healey, 2006). Although the deliberative dimension and the role of the mediator are identified as key aspects of collaborative governance, little is known about the mechanisms and factors that are conducive to the "collaborative" dimension of governance and how collaboration actually occurs (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kapucu, Yuldashev, Barkiev, 2009).

This study aims at identifying structures and processes that facilitate or hinder the interactive dimension of collaborative governance. This appears most relevant in urban contexts, where the interests of governments, private actors and citizens are spatially

intertwined. The basic assumption is that collaborative governance depends on the occurrence of reframings.

In order to explore the interactive dimension of collaborative governance, case studies were conducted on two planning processes that were carried out in Curitiba (Parana, Brazil) and Montreal (Quebec, Canada) in 2014-2015, which resulted in the adoption of two urban development plans. In the case of Curitiba, the democratic practices of urban policies were theoretically and practically non-existent before the Master Plan development process was initiated in 2014, as required by the 2001 City Statute, a Brazilian federal law. In Montreal, consultations on local issues have become common practice since the mid-1980s, with the city even establishing an independent office for public consultation in 2002 (OCPM, 2007). Selecting two culturally different cases allowed us to identify crucial moments or key variables that are determinant in the interactions between public and private actors. The data consists of 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with ten key informants selected in each of the two targeted cities. It represents the variety of organizations and actors involved throughout the planning process and urban development. Planning documents and media coverage further supplemented this analysis.

A literature review subsequently enhances this presentation by offering constructive insights regarding the concepts of institutional arrangements, framing perspectives and collaborative governance, representing the second section of this article. The third section offers a detailed account of the methodology and research techniques used in this analysis. The cases of Curitiba and Montreal are then contextualized, especially with respect to their planning regimes, and the study results for each city are presented. The fifth section compares both planning processes, shedding light on the interactions amongst and between the concerned stakeholders. The results are then discussed and summarized in the conclusion.

4.2 Literature Review

4.2.1 Collaborative governance

Government essentially consists of a centralized and hierarchical governing approach in which decision-making processes ultimately depend on the State, whereas governance looks at the interplay between state and civil society and the extent to which

collective projects can be achieved through a joint public and private mobilization (Pierre, 2011). In a collaborative governance approach, the decision-making processes are shared amongst public and private stakeholders, presented as horizontally related (Ansell & Gash, 2007).

The participation of different stakeholders in governance can occur at various degrees; Vodoz (2013 : 174), summarizing Arnstein's (1969) categorization, identifies four levels of participation: 1) Information, which aims to make a proposal known; 2) Consultation, where the opinions of the participants are heard, but not necessarily taken into account; 3) "Concertation", a French concept referring to dialogue and consensus-building among equal partners; and 4) Negotiation and co-decision, where decision making is shared among partners. Collaborative governance would correspond to "concertation", negotiation and co-decision, which display higher levels of participation from stakeholders.

4.2.2   Institutional Arrangements

Institutional arrangements comprise institutions, actors and organizations as well as their interactions, which are the basis of collaborative governance (Souto-Maior & Gondim, 1992; Aoki, 2007). In this study, institutions are defined as norms of behavior and routines of practice embedded and continuously reproduced through society, which act as a stimuli that determines individual choices (North, 1991; 1992; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Healey, 1997; Hodgson, 2006; Aoki, 2007). These "rules of the game" can be formal (such as laws and regulations) or informal (such as beliefs, shared habits of thought and action, cultures and codes of conduct) (North, 2003 : 3). Organizations include companies, political parties, regulatory agencies, schools, and any other form of social groups that share common values and are recognized by others by such values, whereas actors are individuals whose political role has acquired such an importance that they can influence organizations, institutions, and public opinion. Organizations and actors conform and are conformed by the institutions.

4.2.3   Framing perspectives

According to Gray (2004), the failure of collaboration can be explained by the identity of the actors and organizations included in the institutional arrangement and their divergence of opinions or perceptions. These conflicting views, which may otherwise be

called frames or framing (Benford & Snow, 2000; Kaufman, Elliott, Shmuelli, 2003), shall be termed to framing perspectives in this study, since this term implies that an actor's beliefs or preconceptions influences his or her perspective. Because framing perspectives define the way stakeholders interpret situations and structure their relationships with other stakeholders, it is considered the central element for understanding the character and course of governance processes (Souto-Maior & Gondim, 1992; Benford & Snow, 2000; Kaufman, Elliott, Shmueli, 2003; Gray, 2004).

Most actors and organizations usually perceive negotiations in terms of competing interests, culminating as the success or failure of conflicting parties (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). In this type of bargaining, identifying a common ground for collaboration becomes difficult. If the stakeholders can recognize their different framing perspectives and still develop new common frames for problems and solutions, they have the potential to reach a collaborative solution. Instead of maintaining the win-lose perspective, reframing contributes to the emergence of a sense of commitment amongst stakeholders, which enables them to seek collective objectives (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). For this reason, Gray (2004) considers reframing processes central to viable collaborative partnerships.

However, a mediator is usually required to help promoting the establishment of new collective values, which reflect and correspond to the multiplicity of framing perspectives held by the concerned stakeholders (Schwarz, 2006; Ansell, Gash, 2007; O'Brien, 2012). Substantially neutral, the mediator maintains a reasonable distance from the disputes amongst stakeholders, fosters transparency throughout the deliberative process and assists in the identification and visualisation of the problems to be solved.

4.2.4   Frameworks of analysis

Our understanding of the collaborative process dynamics is based on the models developed by Ansell and Gash (2007), Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012), and Morse and Stephens's (2012). These theoretical models explain how adjustments must be made amongst stakeholders throughout the process for collaboration to happen. The first two models focus on the interactions between the variables considered important by the authors. According to Ansell and Gash (2007), greater attention should be paid to the interactive effects of trust and interdependence amongst stakeholders, since these elements maintain the actors and organizations' interests in the process. The model

developed by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012) emphasises the causal interactions of the different collaborative phases of the processes, since the involvement of stakeholders vary at different levels and phases.

The model proposed by Morse and Stephens (2012) focuses on the phases of collaborative governance processes and the respective competences these require to ensure collaboration. Although some abilities relate to specific phases, others apply during the whole process, such as willingness to create public value, systemic thinking, openness and risk taking, and a sense of mutuality and connectedness.

4.3   Methodology

In order to explore the occurrence of reframings amongst stakeholders, we conducted two case studies in cities with distinct historical backgrounds in participatory planning: Curitiba, where the planning has historically been technocratic, and Montreal, where consultative processes are common practice since the mid-1980s. In Curitiba, the participatory process surrounding the 2014 Master Plan was selected, since it was promoted by a left-leaning political coalition that took office in 2012 after decades of technocratic government. In Montreal, the consultative process leading to the adoption of the 2015 Montreal Urban Agglomeration Land Use and Development Plan (SAD) was selected because it was the most recent plan developed at local and regional levels.

Data is based on 10 semi-structured interviews conducted in each city with organizations and actors involved in the planning process and urban development (Appendix 01). Key respondents were identified in each city based on public hearing documents, media coverage, and recommendations from other informants.

The semi-structured interview protocol comprised 19 questions organized into five categories: i) a descriptive account of the respondents; ii) the institutional arrangements, the framing perspectives and the interactions between stakeholders; iii) history of conflicts and mediations; iv) the stakeholders' involvement in the process; and v) the stakeholders' evaluation of the process. The interviews, transcripts and a qualitative analysis were carried out in 2015 and 2016.

Based on the three theoretical models presented in the literature review, a heuristic tool was developed and used to understand the interactions amongst the variables in the

governance process, and to identify the elements that facilitate or hinder collaboration. This heuristic tool for collaborative governance is presented and discussed in Figure 09.

4.4 Case Studies

4.4.1 Brazil formal planning institutions

After 21 years under military dictatorship, Brazil's redemocratization was promulgated through the introduction of a new constitution in 1988. As part of the decentralization of power, this constitution granted municipalities the autonomy to elect mayors and develop Master Plans. It also includes a chapter pertaining to urban policy and the social functions of cities.

The 20 subsequent years gave rise to the debates on urban reform that led to the enactment of the federal City Statute in 2001. This federal law sets the parameters of urban policy, establishing a participatory process in the development of Master Plans with compulsory revisions every 10 years.

Fourteen years after the promulgation of the City Statute, another national law, the Metropolis Statute, was established, setting general guidelines for planning, management and execution of public functions of common interest in metropolitan areas and urban agglomerations (Brasil, 2015). The 2015 Metropolis Statute requires local Master Plans to conform with the Metropolitan Integrated Urban Development Plans (PDUI) (Figure 05). However, its implementation is still in the early stages and there are few practical experiences throughout Brazil.

Figure 05: Brazil's planning structure

Source: Author, 2016

4.4.1.1 Curitiba Master Plan (2014)

Following the adoption of the City Statute in 2001 and the 10-year update requirement, the municipal government of Curitiba started the process by revising its 2004 Master Plan in 2014. The responsibility of reviewing the Master Plan was divided amongst the executive and legislative branches of the municipal council, the former responsible for its development and the latter for deliberating, voting, and turning their decisions into law.

The process led by the executive branch began with a series of public hearings that involved more than 300 governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations. Public hearings were jointly held by the Curitiba Research and Urban Planning Institute - IPPUC, a municipal institute that has the legal responsibility of developing the Master Plan, the Curitiba City Commission, as well as Concitiba, the municipal collegial body on urban policy (Curitiba, 2014). These organizations held 91 public and private consultative

hearings and working sessions related to the Master Plan, resulting in the first draft of the plan.

The first draft was discussed by governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in an expanded plenary session held by Concitiba, resulting in the inclusion of 47 amendments (Concitiba - B, 2014). The second draft was subsequently presented to the mayor, who then submitted the Master Plan to the City Council to be voted (Curitiba - B, 2015).

Before receiving the second draft, the legislative branch of the City Council held eight public hearings related to the Master Plan (in addition to the ones conducted by the IPPUC). After receiving the second draft, the City Council organized four thematic workshops, where another 223 amendments to the Master Plan were proposed. These amendments were voted in twelve sessions, and 61% of them were included in the final draft, which was sent to the mayor.

In December 2015, the mayor approved the Master Plan law, with 5 vetoes to the 137 amendments that were approved by the councilmen. The law was implemented in February 2016. As stated in official documents, a total of 6,305 people from civil society were involved in the Curitiba Master Plan review process (Concitiba - A, 2015), which is summarized in Figure 06.

Figure 06: 2014 Curitiba Master Plan formal process

Source: Author, 2016

4.4.1.1.1 Results

Despite the improvements to the planning process and the high level of mobilization it generated, the respondents we interviewed unanimously observed that old habits and behaviors, consolidated through decades of the city planning, perpetuated the informal negotiations traditionally practiced among the executive and legislative branches and some key stakeholders.

The 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process began after the popular uprising that swept the country in 2013 for increased public participation and improvements to urban matters. These mass protests followed the 2012 municipal elections in Curitiba, which led to the replacement of the political group that had managed the city for decades by a left-leaning political coalition. This context influenced the institutional arrangement of the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan, bringing to the table a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations.

The respondents unanimously declared that the common belief of the stakeholders and the general public on the importance of the Master Plan explained their high level of engagement in the process. Participants were not, however, certain that there would be spaces for effective participation given the traditional and pervasive planning practices of Curitiba. In fact, despite the numerous formal events, there were no real opportunities or room for collective discussions and integrated development planning. Inequalities were further exposed amongst participating stakeholders within the institutional arrangements. Whilst key economic actors and organizations benefitted from a horizontal and fairly egalitarian relationship established through the IPPUC and the city council, the interactions between the stakeholders from civil society and the IPPUC revealed a vertical and hierarchical order.

In addition, some respondents noted the opacity of the process. The IPPUC did not present and explain their project during the public hearings, and the entrepreneurs did not submit their proposals during the public hearings, but delivered it directly to the institute as well as to the city council. As reported by Respondent 2: "we did not see the entrepreneurs in the public hearings held by the IPPUC or in the city council thematic chambers, but we heard their discourse in those spaces by the councilmen and the [IPPUC] professionals". The respondents from the real estate and business sectors also reported that both the

IPPUC and the city council informally met with them to discuss and negotiate their demands and proposals, which were later incorporated to the plan.

Feeling unrepresented, the general public participated in the events organized by the city council in the hopes that their proposals would be incorporated to the plan through amendments. As noted by Respondent 10: "do you know how many amendments were proposed? 223. If the second draft [truly] represented the political forces of the city and included the recommendations of civil society, it would not have faced so many amendments". Although 8 out of 10 respondents felt that a number of their proposals were included in the plan, half of them asserted that the city council maintained their usual planning methods and practices essentially based on exclusive political negotiations.

4.4.2   Quebec formal planning institutions

Canadian municipalities are subject to provincial planning legislations. The Act Respecting Land Use Planning and Development (LAU), which prevails in the province of Quebec, was adopted in 1979. The LAU defines the land use planning and development regime in Quebec as a shared responsibility between the provincial, metropolitan, regional and municipal levels of government, integrated through a "cascading" or "conformity" system.

The Montreal Metropolitan Community (CMM), a supra-regional organisation that includes the cities of Montreal, Laval, Longueuil, as well as the outer suburbs, is responsible for metropolitan planning. The mayors represented at the Metropolitan community adopt a metropolitan land use and development plan (PMAD, in French), a long-range development plan that includes broader objectives regarding transportation, environment, urbanization, metropolitan facilities, etc. It also establishes guidelines for the Regional County Municipalities' land use and development plan (SAD, in French). The SAD must include elements such as planning and development orientations, public facilities, economic centres, public transit projects, built heritage sites, land use regulations and densities in targetted areas.

Both the PMAD and SAD must be in compliance with the Quebec government land use policies and directions, and obtain the authorisation of both the metropolitan community and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the Ministry of Territorial Occupation (MAMOT). The LAU also requires that these plans undergo formal public hearings. At the

local level, every municipality must produce a master plan or a planning program, which defines local land use regulations, zoning and densities. Local Master plans and by-laws must be consistent with the SAD. These are further subject to the approval of the Regional County Municipalities.

The LAU states that the PMAD, the SAD and the Master plan must be reviewed every 5 years. Quebec's planning scheme is illustrated in Figure 07.

Figure 07: Quebec's planning structure

Source: Author, 2016

In addition to the plans required by the LAU, the city charter of Montreal requires the municipality to adopt a "plan for the development of its territory that encompasses the environmental, transportation and community, cultural, economic and social development objectives pursued by the city" (Government of Quebec, 2016, A. 91). For the municipality, this development plan (PDM), which has no regulatory power nor any ties to the LAU, presents a strategic vision providing references for the review process of the SAD and the Master Plan (City of Montreal, 2012).

4.4.2.1 Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD) (2015)

The SAD is a planning document intended for the agglomeration , which comprises the city of Montreal and its 19 boroughs, as well as 16 reconstituted (demerged) municipalities. The legislation requires the adoption of a SAD within the two years following the approval of the PMAD. Considering that the adoption and entry into force of the PMAD occurred in 2012, the development and adoption process of the SAD formally began in 2013 and was completed in 2015.

The crafting process for the SAD of Montreal was divided into three phases. The first consisted in the development of a first project by the planning division of the City of Montreal in collaboration with key stakeholders, such as the CMM, the provincial government, the reconstituted municipalities as well as a select number of non-profit organizations. Once a consensus was reached, the first draft was adopted by the Council of the agglomeration and sent to the government of Quebec for analysis.

The second phase, which pertained to the formal consultation stage, included mandatory public hearings. The consultation process was conducted by the commission of the SAD, a public consultation body principally composed of the mayors from the municipalities of the agglomeration, and established by the agglomeration council. This consultative process began with 4 informational sessions, followed by 3 public hearing sessions where private actors, non-profit organizations and the general public were invited to share their comments, suggestions and citicisms and present their briefs., At this stage, the Montreal Metropolitan Community and the MAMOT additionally transmitted their first notice of compliance regarding the first draft to the Mayor of Montreal (MAMOT, 2014).

The third and concluding phase involved drafting and adopting the second (and final) version of the SAD. This version was based on the analysis of all contributions given during the public hearings performed by the planning division of the city of Montreal and the Commission. It further included the directives provided by the provincial government. The final draft included 42% of the 126 recommendations submitted by the public. The CMM and the MAMOT issued a conformity certificate and final notice of compliance from the analysis of this version in March and April 2015, respectively (MAMOT, 2015), as summarized below (Figure 08).

Figure 08: Montreal 2015 SAD formal process

Source: Author, 2016

4.4.2.1.1   Results

The interviews revealed two fundamental aspects of the SAD consultation process. First, the succession of multiple consultative hearings confused the stakeholders with respect to the importance of the SAD, which ultimately led to their demobilization. Second, public audiences were not the main consultation and participation forum for stakeholders.

The SAD process followed two important planning processes that took place in Montreal: the PMAD, adopted in 2012, and the PDM, which was developed in 2012-2013 although never adopted because of the election of a new mayor in 2013. All the respondents asserted that both the PMAD and the PDM planning processes mobilized significant public participation, and that the PMAD was considered the first successful large-scale civil society mobilization in the Montreal region. This social engagement was not, however, sustained for throughout SAD development process.

The PMAD gathered considerable attention because it was represented as the "last chance" for the metropolitan area to adopt a strategic development plan. The establishment of a metropolitan plan had been pursued as an obligation since 2002. Its

development and adoption was, however, continuously postponed by the local elected officials at the CMM because instability and confusion surrounding the Quebec planning regime. It took a legislative reform and a citizen's agora in 2010 to instigate the momentum required to break the inertia of "comfortable political disagreement". When the first draft underwent public scrutiny, civil society championed the document and mobilized their bases to encourage public participation in the consultation processes and guarantee the adoption of the mandatory development plan.

The two rounds of public consultations for the Development Plan of the City of Montreal (PDM) also displayed a significant amount of participation. The first round, conducted by the City of Montreal in each borough, lasted a year and mobilized over 1,000 participants; whilst the second round, conducted by an independent organization set up by the municipality in 2002 named the Montreal Office of Public Consultation (OCPM) and who carried out various consultation mandates, showcased comparable levels of public interest.

Since the new Montreal mayor had only recently decided to abandon the PDM when the SAD process began, people were confused and alienated by the succession of consultative processes. As Interviewee 17 put it: "people called us and asked: 'Is it worth it that we go? Is it really going to change anything?'". The intensity and expasivity of the participatory processes of previous consultative hearings discouraged people from attending those organised for the SAD. The same respondent explained: "(...) and we start again a new document, the SAD... And there had been the PMAD, the PDM, the Master Plan, that is coming soon. People got a little fed up, were a little bit tired, either in-house or outside".

The SAD was additionally presented as a technical document required by the LAU and consequently perceived as something very distant from or relatively insignificant to everyday life. People were unaware of the role the SAD played in the regional planning process, nor the importance of their participation in the process. Respondents notably explained: "Who talks about the SAD other than special-interest groups? Nobody!" (Interviewee 17); "the SAD... No one knew what it meant; no one knew what you could raise" (Interviewee 15). The SAD did not call for the same level of participation and attention from the public than other planning documents:

The PMAD required a large consensus of the elected representatives of the entire metropolitan area, we are speaking here of over 80 elected persons. So we absolutely need to interest any group to submit a memoir, no matter their position. (...) I was not interested [in the SAD] because I considered that the PMAD provided enough security and that the other exercise was purely for the sake of conformity. So I did not bother myself with it, and I do not believe many people were interested in it as well. The PMAD is strategic. The SAD is tactical, but weak. The Master Plan is tactical and operational, the PPU [Plan particulier d'urbanisme] is very operational (Interviewee 6).

The SAD was thus perceived as an occasion for municipalities within the agglomeration of Montreal to internalize the objectives emitted by the CMM and the government of Quebec, rather than an opportunity for citizens to imagine and express their visions of urban and regional development.

Consequently and despite formal public hearings, key discussions pertaining to the content of the SAD did not occur during the public consultations. The SAD development process was informally initiated by municipal administrations in collaboration with carefully selected stakeholders. Together, they discussed and negotiated their proposals during informal meetings and drafted a preliminary development proposal later subjected to public consultations. In fact, the initial negotiations held between the key stakeholders continued throughout the public consultation phase. As explained by Interviewee 18: "we reiterate messages, say them publicly, but in most cases, we intervene earlier, in preparation to these consultations – privately, semi-privately, to expose and discuss challenges and positions". As the proposals presented to the public hearing represent a consensus reached by the stakeholders following several weeks of negotiation, there was little space for substantial changes in the consultative step, besides for relatively minor, local issues.

4.5   Comparison

The analysis allowed us to identify three similarities and one major difference between the planning processes conducted in the development of Curitiba's Master Plan and Montreal's SAD.

In both cases, the interactions between the organizations responsible for crafting the plan and the stakeholders hinged on their role or identity. Whereas frequent interactions, negotiations and a spirit of collaboration occurred amongst key stakeholders holding historical partnerships as well as common interests, interdependencies, and negotiation,

the participation of other actors from civil society was confined to "public hearing" phases. With actors considered as "partners", the relationship is more horizontal; exchanges are frequent and conducive to consensus-building. With the other groups, the relationship is more vertical; exchanges are less frequent, and "public hearings" represent the occasion for the concerned parties to defend, rather than discuss and negotiate their opinions and interests.

Collaboration depends on a stakeholder's assigned, represented or enacted position, as well as the arenas in which their negotiations occur. Some stakeholders do not negotiate in public. Stakeholders that have a horizontal relationship with the organization responsible for crafting the plan negotiate in informal or private settings. Again, all other actors are confined to the "public hearings", which are considered as a mandatory step rather than as the main discussion arena. Public hearings became a means of legitimizing the process, regardless of the contributions included in the development plan. As clearly expressed by Interviewee 19 of Montreal: "Why are you having this fight now, at the consultative stage? Why didn't you invest more in the earlier stages? So the consultative stage would be really a test to see: 'Did we get it right?'. As opposed to a negotiation stage, because consultative processes are not good for negotiation".

In spite of the noted differences between the structures and operations of the organizations responsible for the public hearing phases in Curitiba and Montreal, they were both unfavourable to collaborative governance. In Curitiba, the process was held by IPPUC, the municipal planning institute responsible for the city planning since 1965. According to respondents, the participatory process followed the practices that had been established for decades, resulting in a rigid and opaque dynamic, which excluded consensus-building processes. In Montreal, the public hearing phase occurred through a commission created specifically for the SAD. According to respondents, the consultation's "format", which reflected traditional public hearing settings, the short time-span allocated for to preparation of the consultation, and the definition of a commission essentially composed of elected local officials hindered public participation. Thus, whereas in Curitiba the perpetuation of the planning practices of the IPPUC was considered by the interviewees as one of the elements that prevented interactions amongst stakeholders, in Montreal, the establishment of a new commission composed of elected officials who were not experts in planning, nor in collaborative governance processes, contributed to the

suspiciousness of the respondents towards the public hearing phase of the planning process.

Public mobilization and the way the process was presented or marketed by political and planning authorities was different in both cases. In Curitiba, the importance of public involvement was carried out by the municipal government, civil society and the media. The extensive public participation in Curitiba can also be explained by the momentum surrounding the 2014 Master Plan, which was built upon the 2013 protests and the municipal election that brought a left-wing group to power. Civil society perceived this consultation as an opportunity to discuss urban issues, since the Master Plan represents the regulatory instrument for zoning and land use. In Montreal, the planning process was not covered by the media and did not draw much public attention due to the fact two major consultative processes preceded the SAD: the PMAD and the PDM, which stimulated considerable attention, drained a lot of energy, and contributed to a sentiment of disillusion (in the case of the PDM). Moreover, its presentation as a technical document conceived for the agglomeration scale led to public disengagement. The purpose of the plan, which is to translate metropolitan objectives into regional ones, was also perceived as an occasion for local elected officials and the provincial government to negotiate regional affectations amongst themselves, rather than as an opportunity for the public to reflect on planning objectives.

In Curitiba, the substantial involvement of civil society in the planning process was undermined by informal institutions of urban planning, perpetuating the relationship of select business actors, municipal authorities and professionals. However, key elements improved and strengthened the city governance, which represents an important step towards the development of a collaborative culture. These factors include: the multiplication of public hearing sessions; the messages of politicians, planners, press and civil society emphasizing the importance of participation; and the constant and intense pressure applied by civil society on the municipal administration throughout the process. In Montreal, the formal multi-level governance institutions that determined the SAD's development resulted in a rigid process, where the interactions were essentially restricted to different levels of government, and the participation of the civil society was considered secondary. These aspects underscored the disdain conveyed by the lack of interventions from politicians and planning professionals to promote the participation of civil society, as reflected in the inexistence of a widespread public campaigns or public messages

informing people about the process and its importance. People were not aware of the purpose of the plan, and the SAD was perceived as another plan within a major system of urban plans.

4.6   Discussion

What does the evidence presented in this study mean for collaborative governance in urban planning? To understand the dynamics within institutional arrangements and their influence in their operations, we developed a heuristic tool based on key elements of the models proposed by Ansell & Gash (2007), Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2012), Morse & Stephens (2012).

Actors and organizations enter the governance process with their interests and histories of conflicts and alliances. Their participation can also be motivated by incentives (or disincentives). Actors and organizations have their own framing perspectives, which make them prioritize certain components of the planning process, assess each problem from a particular standpoint, and identify preferred solutions. The mediator is the neutral actor who conciliates the stakeholders' different framing perspectives, whilest taking into account formal and informal institutions. Collaboration occurs when participants undergo a reframing process, where stakeholders rebalance initial beliefs and priorities, based on the viewpoints of other participants.

Figure 09: Heuristic tool for collaborative governance

Source: Author, 2016, based on Ansell & Gash (2007), Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2012), Morse & Stephens (2012)

In Curitiba, the informal institutions were the strongest factor influencing the collaborative process. Despite the inclusion of a large number of actors and organizations from civil society in the 2014 planning process, and regardless of the large mobilization surrounding the Master Plan, the informal institutions in Curitiba persisted and the planning process remained controlled by IPPUC and real estate actors.

In Montreal, the main factors influencing the collaboration were those corresponding to the "interest to participate" and the "history of conflict/alliances". The plan's scale further contributed, in different ways, to the unwillingness of stakeholders to participate in the SAD process, i.e. as a "mid-range" regional plan positioned between the metropolitan and local levels,. Moreover, the fact that the consultation mechanism essentially consisted of public hearings conducted by a commission of local elected officials appeared unfavourable for participation. In the same vein, the agglomeration, located at the administrative or government level, had little legitimacy in the eyes of both the population and the elected officials.

The intermeshing of actors and organizations presented in the heuristic graph illustrates the significance of their interactions within the institutional arrangements of the planning structures and operations of the two case studies. It also refers to the assumption that the interdependency amongst stakeholders contributes to their engagement throughout the process. In both cities, local governments and real estate developers are interdependent. Local governments need real estate development as a means to increase their revenues from property taxes, whilst real estate developers need lands as well as

permits to develop. Non-profit organizations and various interest groups, conversely, rely or depend to various extents on local governments according to the funding they may potentially or actually receive from the city government. This study consequently demonstrates how interdependencies in urban planning can lead to inequities and produce unintended consequences.

The framing perspectives of the stakeholders from Curitiba and Montreal determined their interactions throughout the processes of collaborative governance. In Curitiba, there was effective collaboration amongst the entrepreneurs, the IPPUC and the City council due to the considerable interests at stakeunderscoring the Master Plan's development, as well as because of the exclusive relationships that had been established for decades between these stakeholders. In Montreal, the development of the SAD mostly occurred through negotiations held between the provincial government, the regional planners and city representatives. The multilevel governance of this particular planning process shows the interdependency amongst the different levels of governments. Here, the institutional arrangement essentially comprised discussions and interactions between public actors and organizations. In both cases, planning was performed in the planners' offices with government representatives. These were not made transparently and collaboratively with civil society and actors from the private sector. Although a few local battles were fought, the public hearing phases of these processes were not conducive to dialogue.

Because of the diversity of framing perspectives within an institutional arrangement, the presence of a mediator is important to help reframing to occur. Collaboration happens when participants rebalance their initial beliefs and priorities, after understanding the viewpoint of other participants. In both cases, the existence and the role of a mediator were unclear. There might have been some mediators within each group of actors who helped them reach a consensus, but there did not seem to be a mediator for the process as a whole.

The heuristic tool finally allowed us to discover that the inclusion of recommendations in the final version of the plan does not automatically indicates a successful collaboration. The stakeholders did not judge the quality of collaborative processes based on the inclusion of the recommendations, but on the quality of the interactions and the perception of their inclusion in the process (a felling that they had been heard and considered). Although the final version of the plan in both cases included

many recommendations (62% in Curitiba and 42% in Montreal), the civil society was dissatisfied with the process, stating that there was no room for deliberation. Moreover, the inclusion of the stakeholders recommendations do not necessarily lead to a positive outcome, as in both cases, the plans did not innovate as much as they could, otherwise, have.

4.7 Conclusion

Based on these findings, what can be said of the mechanisms, the factors and the processes that allow reframing to happen? What structures and processes facilitate or hinder the deliberative/interactive dimensions of collaborative governance?

First, this study shows that different stakeholders participate in different ways at different phases throughout the process. Whereas some stakeholders benefit from multiple rounds of negotiation, others are confined to public hearings, which, in our cases, were not conducive to dialogue. Moreover, once a consensus is reached amongst key stakeholders, it is very difficult for other stakeholders to intervene and to make significant contributions to the negotiated plan.   This undermines the transparency of the process and the permeability of the plan, which are key aspects of collaborative governance (Kapucu, Yuldashev and Barkiev, 2009; O´Brien, 2012). Collaborative governance can only occur if all stakeholders contribute to the development of the preliminary versions of the plan, and if there are some mechanisms or instruments in place for retroaction and dialogue.

Second, as advocated by Gaudin (2002) and by Hermet, Kazancigil and Prud'Homme (2005), co-optation processes weaken the principles of governance. The legitimacy and representativeness of participatory processes are undermined in contexts where stakeholders perceive restrictions to open interactions for or between specific actors and organizations determined by governmental organizations, and where the outcomes of the participatory process is considered as predetermined by specific groups behind closed doors.

Third, the geographic scale of the plan and the way it was presented to the public were decisive factors in both examined cases. "What's in it for me?" was the question that motivated people's participation - actors and organizations will invest their efforts in processes that they believe will ensure their own prospects (North, 2003). Every stakeholder has an initial perspective on the planning process. However, the way the plan

is presented or framed can lead the stakeholders to reframe their initial perspective and therefore change their behavior. This phenomenon is referred to the "stickiness" of the message as conceived by Gladwell (2000: 92). In other words, the message can be framed in a way that preserves or entices the interest of stakeholders in participating.

Fourth, although some authors considered the existence of interdependence amongst stakeholders as a key element of the collaborative aspect of governance (Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kapucu, Yuldashev & Barkiev, 2009; O´Brien, 2012; Vodoz, 2013), our analysis suggests that interdependence might strengthen existing formal and informal institutions, to the detriment of collective interests. Despite the fact that frequent interactions can facilitate reframings, the interdependencies identified in the two examined case studies perpetuated the overlapping interests of some stakeholders, favoring only some of those involved, highlighting the asymmetries of power, doubts or reservations, as well as fragmentations and imbalances within their institutional arrangements. This suggests that, in cases where there are strong institutions, interdependence is only positive for those who are directly involved, which compromises the success of processes intended be inclusive and collaborative.

Lastly, this study compared two plans embedded in series of plans distributed at different scales. In the case of the SAD in Montreal, it is the consultation fatigue and the type of planning document that explains the lack of participation. This finding suggests that the planning regime as a whole, including the existence of metropolitan, regional and local plans and their regulatory systems, ought to be evaluated in order to qualify the extent of collaboration between planning authorities and stakeholders within each region, since not all plans require the same level of participation. Some plans may only correspond to the interest of certain stakeholders over time. For example, the proposals of some interest groups that may not be relevant for the scale or the scope of a particular plan could perhaps be integrated at a later time and at a more appropriate level.

Despite the noted differences of scale, subject, culture and political context, the results are similar in terms of institutional dynamics and outcomes. Considering that the communicated message or the framing can be used as a tool to spark or maintain public mobilization, future research should focus on the role of planners and elected officials in communicating planning objectives, and how plans can be presented in a way that fosters collaboration and improves public participation, both in terms of quantity and substance.

Appendices

Appendix 03 - Selection of Respondents – Curitiba and Montreal

PROFILE OF RESPONDENT	SEGMENT	ORGANIZATION OF THE RESPONDENT	REPRESENTATIVE	ROLE IN THE PROCESS
Governmental organizations	Public Sector			
Non-governmental organizations	Social Movements and Popular Organizations			
Academia, press, civil society	Academia			
	Press			
	Civil society			

Source: Author, 2015

Appendix 04 - Differences between the two analyzed processes

2014 Curitiba Master Plan	2015 Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD)
Strong municipal context	Strong metropolitan context
Local plan	Regional plan
Main tool of planning	One instrument among others - lesser importance
City Statute – very general	LAU – very detailed
Several sets of public hearings	One set of public hearings
Spontaneous participation	Institutionalized participation
IPPUC - technicians	Commission – elected mayors/politicians
Strong informal institutions	Strong formal institutions
Press was very important	Press was not important – "had no coverage, because it generates no interest"

Source: Author, 2016

5   DISCUSSION & GENERAL CONCLUSION

This chapter compares the Curitiba and Montreal cases in light of the results presented in the papers and discusses the practical and theoretical implications of this study. It is divided into three sections. The first section provides a discussion of the results by summarizing the outcome data and answering initial research questions. The second section presents the theoretical implications of this study, identifying specific contributions to the literature and discussing the study's limitations. Finally, the chapter ends with general concluding remarks.

5.1   Discussion on Research Questions

Do technocratic and collaborative planning processes lead to different results?

In order to investigate this question, a comparative case study of 2004 Curitiba Master Plan and 2014 Curitiba Master Plan was developed in the first paper. The analysis of the composition of the institutional arrangements in the 2004 and 2014 Curitiba Master Plan processes showed that the old technocratic arrangement shifted to a more collaborative one. This transition was formally brought about through the inclusion of numerous, new representatives from civil society and through the proposals that were partially included in the plan.

During the development of the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan, 9 public hearings were held by IPPUC, and some presentations were delivered only to partnering segments. Approximately 1 500 people were involved in the process, and only two of the 142 amendments proposed during the public events were included in the draft law forwarded to the city council.

Ten years later, the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process occurred through a more democratic institutional arrangement. The 2012 municipal elections replaced the long-standing political group that managed Curitiba with a left-leaning political group. The discourse of this new group emphasized that the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process would be based on collaborative governance instead of the centralized and traditional planning that had been practiced in the city.

The new political group, and the intense popular manifestations demanding more participation and improvements in the area of urban planning which erupted in major cities

across the country in 2013, brought a number of governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations into the institutional arrangement of the process.

During the development of the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process, IPPUC and the Curitiba City Commission (Concitiba) held 91 public and private events, and independent groups held another 12 workshops. A total of 6 305 people were involved in the process. Of the 213 amendments proposed by different stakeholders, 137 were approved by the city council.

However, despite the substantial engagement of different stakeholders in the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process and the numerous public hearings throughout the development of the plan, both the 2004 and the 2014 processes led to the same restricted interactions and the same assessment of the plan. As mentioned during the interviews realized in this study, the city's development was determined by a small number of business organizations and actors with close and opaque relations to the municipal authorities and professionals. As reported by some respondents, the 2014 plan makes advances in some areas, mainly resulting from the mobilization of civil society, but continues to open city planning to the business sector. Therefore, despite the high number of amendments included in the final draft, most respondents judged the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan to be as generic as the 2004 Curitiba Master Plan.

Despite the negative criticism regarding the final quality of the plan, as well as the lack of clarity seen in the development of the process, the elaboration of the 2014 Master Plan of Curitiba is seen as emblematic, given the constant and intense pressure from civil society on the municipal administration, which in turn reveals a transformation in the importance that people attribute to participatory processes. This finding suggests that the democratic composition of an institutional arrangement is the first step in a gradual transformation to develop a collaborative culture which leads to collectively developed plans.

Which elements are responsible for the endurance of established practices in urban planning processes?

The second paper focused on clarifying this question through a case study on the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan process. The observations presented in the study showed that the shared informal institutions in Curitiba resulted in a set of patterns which determined

the development of urban planning processes. This analysis corresponds to the phenomenon of path dependence. The interdependent relations that are informally institutionalized in Curitiba overcame the democratic institutional arrangement, enforcing established habits in the urban planning of the city.

Moreover, other elements such as low levels trust among the stakeholders, asymmetries of power in the institutional arrangement, and lack of a mediator throughout the process were also decisive to the depletion of collaboration. These aspects were exacerbated by the existence of different forums related to the plan, resulting in weakened unity of the institutional arrangement, to the extent that actors and organizations are divided and occupy different spaces in the process.

Thus, even if the institutional arrangement is composed of various actors and organizations, the absence of neutral elements that can promote balance between the stakeholders and a collaborative environment can prevent the development of a collective construction. In these cases the process may be manipulated, and the final product may be vulnerable to existing imbalances of power in the institutional arrangement and will only address the interests of those who are routinely invited to collaborate.

Which structures and processes facilitate or hinder the interactive dimension of collaborative governance?

In order to clarify this understanding, in the third paper we conducted two case studies on two planning processes carried out in Curitiba and Montreal in 2014-2015 which present different urban planning cultures and contexts. In Curitiba, the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan was the first urban planning process developed with a more democratic institutional arrangement and practices. In Montreal, the Montreal urban agglomeration land use and development plan (SAD, in French) is the most recent plan that was developed at the local level, where public participation is a common practice since the mid-1980s.

In Curitiba the informal institutions within the institutional arrangement were the strongest factor determining the continuation of established planning practices in the city, which prevented collaboration among the stakeholders. In Montreal, the main factors that compromised popular engagement were the elements corresponding to "interest in participating" and "history of conflict/alliances" in the heuristic tool. The scale of the plan,

the way the message about the plan and the process was passed by planners and elected officials to civil society, and the fact that the SAD had been preceded by two major consultative processes (which gathered a lot of participation and drained a lot of energy) resulted in the demobilization of actors and organizations.

Apart from these aspects, in both cities the collaborative aspect was generally hindered by the same structures and processes, even with their different cultures of urban planning and management. Despite the variety of stakeholders in the institutional arrangements, in both cases the plans were developed in planners' offices through interaction between some specific actors and organizations and government representatives. Important elements such as the balance of power, communication, openness to mutual gains, and shared vision were restricted to only some stakeholders. These cases were not examples of plans developed transparently and collaboratively with civil society and private actors. Although a few local battles were fought, the rigid format of the public hearings and the opaque dynamic without a space for consensus building were not conducive to dialog.

Moreover, even with the variety of framing perspectives in the institutional arrangements of both Curitiba and Montreal, the existence of mediators and their role was not clear. The respondents did not identify a single neutral facilitator who allowed the stakeholders to reframe their perspectives and actively promoted cooperative alliances. This may also have contributed to the lack of common goals and consensus building, which should have been developed collectively.

5.2 Theoretical implications

5.2.1   Contribution to the literature

This research contributes to the literature by exploring whether and how contextual conditions are reflected in collaboration on urban planning processes, focusing on interactions between variables in governance processes.

The existence of path dependence in urban planning processes might reinforce informal institutions. In this context, not even an institutional arrangement with a more democratic composition might overcome centralized and traditional established practices that prevent substantial advances in city development. This might mean, for instance, that

collaboration between stakeholders will continue depending on the identity/type of actors and organizations, and also on the arena and phase of the process, under the guise of collaboration. The case of Curitiba may exemplify this consideration, where path dependence on ideas, behaviors, and actions perpetuated restrictive practices that were established in the city's urban planning for decades.

This finding is strongly related to the aspect of interdependence. According to Ansell and Gash (2007), Kapucu, Yuldashev and Barkiev (2009), and Vodoz (2013), interdependence promotes the desire to participate and triggers the sense to prioritize collective objectives among stakeholders, promoting mutual control and sanction during the process. These authors also state that interdependence is a key element to achieve collective consensus. In contrast with this statement, the analyses presented herein showed that once interdependence among some stakeholders is informally institutionalized by the habits of actors and organizations, it may perpetuate unilateral interests in the institutional arrangement, reverberating the possibilities of interactions and deliberations that are conditioned by path dependence.

In both Curitiba and Montreal cases, the established interdependence between governmental organizations and the stakeholders from the business sector only guaranteed effective collaboration in these segments, leading to inequities and unintended consequences to the cities. This suggests that in cases where strong formal and informal institutions exist, interdependence is only positive for those who are directly involved, which compromises the success of processes that should be widely inclusive and collaborative.

Ansell (2008b), based on Granovetter, argued that frequent interactions might develop a sense of loyalty and mutual obligation and reciprocity between actors and organizations that are interdependent. Actors and organizations that are not included in this social network might interpret that there is no space for them to intervene in mutual decision making processes that are consensuated by the interdependent stakeholders. Since there are several different framing perspectives in an institutional arrangement, the way the plan and the process are presented or framed can lead stakeholders to reframe their initial perspectives and therefore change their behavior. Since stakeholder participation depends on whether the plan meets their priorities and interests, the plan and the process must be publicized through a message that motivates people's participation.

As stated by Benford and Snow (2000), the challenge, therefore, is to identify how reality should be presented in order to maximize mobilization/collaboration in order to seek collective gains.

In Curitiba, the message about the importance of the Master Plan and public involvement in its development was spread by the municipal government, civil society, and the press, who not only informed the population about the plan and the dates of the public events, but also reported on all stages of the process. The momentum surrounding the 2014 Master Plan, which was built upon the 2013 protests, the municipal elections that brought a left-wing group to power, and the constant advertisements related to the process and the master plan gathered attention of numerous actors and organizations. For civil society, the Master Plan process was perceived as an opportunity to discuss urban issues. The fact that the Master Plan is the instrument which regulates zoning and land use for the next decade also explains the scope of participation.

In Montreal, the planning process did not get media coverage and did not draw much attention from the general public. The fact that it was presented by planning professionals and elected officials as a technical document at the scale of the agglomeration did not encourage a sense of belonging. The plan was perceived as something very distant from the lives of citizens, in such a way that people did not feel impacted by it. People were not aware about the importance of the SAD in the regional planning process as a whole, nor of the importance of their participation in the process, which consequently compromised the engagement of actors and organizations.

Messages are what make something spread. Every stakeholder has an initial perspective on the planning process. However, the way the plan is presented or framed can lead stakeholders to reframe their initial perspectives and therefore change their behavior. This phenomenon is referred to as the "stickiness" of the message, as conceived by Gladwell (2000: 92): "(...) the specific quality that a message needs to be successful is the quality of "stickiness". Is the message memorable? Is it so memorable, in fact, that it can create change, that it can spur someone in action?". In other words, the message can be framed to keep stakeholders interested or make them interested in participating, corresponding to a part of a political and planning strategy.

Regarding the content of the plans, the final version of the analyzed plans included many recommendations (62% in the 2014 Curitiba Master Plan and 42% in the Montreal

urban agglomeration land use and development plan). However, in both cases civil society was dissatisfied with the process, stating that there was no room for deliberation, and almost all of the respondents considered that the plans did not represent the political forces of the cities. Thus, although some authors considered incorporation of proposals resulting from the process into the final product as key aspect befitting the legitimacy of collaborative governance (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2012; Vodoz, 2013), our analysis suggests that judging the quality of collaborative processes is not based on the inclusion of the recommendations, but instead mainly on the quality of the interactions and the stakeholders' perceptions of being heard.

5.2.2   Study limits

The case study method and the research tools were highly valuable because they allowed us to answer the research questions. Likewise, the findings presented in this study are highly relevant, since they suggest the existence of patterns of interactions in governance processes which are related to the endurance of informal institutions, path dependence on ideas, behaviors and actions, co-optation processes weakening the principles of governance, and the communication message as a political and planning tool. This finding is even more interesting considering the international aspect of the study, which may allow the patterns of interactions to be transferable to other Brazilian and Canadian municipalities and regions under governance regimes.

However, this research is not flawless. One possible shortcoming of the study is the normative character that was adopted. This aspect might have influenced the respondents in their answers, especially if they consider that collaborative governance is not efficient. In the same vein, the normative-prescriptive twist adopted throughout the development of the study might have blocked some analysis. Moreover, the study is restricted to municipal and agglomeration levels of urban planning, and consequently does not capture other categories of urban planning processes such as metropolitan areas. In order to amplify the interpretation of the results, the planning regime as a whole, including all the metropolitan, regional and local plans and their system of regulation, ought to be evaluated in order to qualify the extent of collaboration between planning authorities and stakeholders within each region. Likewise, wider analyses that cover other types of urban plans for areas such as mobility, housing, and sanitation may identify other elements in the design of the institutional arrangement which should be considered in the patterns of interactions

identified as well as in the heuristic tool. Moreover, although the criteria or characteristics of collaborative governance were not displayed in the three processes studied here, stakeholder interests or proposals might be taken into account at another time in another plan. In other words, some plans might "respond" to stakeholder interests over time, which could be considered as collaborative governance.

5.3 General Conclusion

Although some elements such as the deliberative dimension and the role of the mediator are identified as key aspects of collaborative governance, little is known about the mechanisms and factors that are conducive to the "collaborative" dimension of collaborative governance and how collaboration actually takes place. Using semi-structured interviews and planning documents, this comparative case study broadened this understanding and focused attention on the qualities of interactions in urban planning processes where the interests of governments, private actors, and citizens are spatially intertwined.

More specifically, this study was conducted to clarify the following central question:

- *How might contextual conditions facilitate or discourage the interactive dimension of collaborative governance?*

To understand the governance processes, and to identify the elements that facilitate or hinder collaboration dynamics within the institutional arrangements and their influence in the processes, a heuristic tool was developed and used as a lens in the case studies. This tool takes into account key elements of the models developed by Ansell & Gash (2007), Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2012), Morse & Stephens (2012), and represent the optimum development of a governance process. With this heuristic tool, we were able to understand the interaction of variables in the analyzed processes, and also to clarify the elements and proceedings that influence the collaborative dimension of governance processes.

Overall, in light of the empirical results, the informal institutions within the institutional arrangement and the elements that correspond to the "interest to participate" and the "history of conflict/alliances" in the heuristic tool are strong factors influencing the collaboration in participatory processes. As suggest by the heuristic tool and diagnosed in

the case studies, these variables indeed impact directly the stakeholders' framing perspectives, determining their interaction throughout the processes.

The interlacement between actors and organizations presented in the heuristic tool correspond to the importance of interactions within the institutional arrangement, and also refers to the assumption that the interdependency among stakeholders contribute to the stakeholders' engagement in the process (Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Ansell, 2008; O´Brien, 2012; Vodoz, 2013). However, instead of representing a positive aspect to the collectivity, the observations presented in this study illustrates how the interdependencies in urban planning can lead to inequities and unintended consequences. Analysis in other planning processes would be important to sketching up the understanding related with this variable, clarifying whether interdependency among stakeholders impacts in the same way different governance processes.

Based on the theoretical framework of analyses presented in this study, the mediator has an important role in governance processes, as suggested in the heuristic tool. Because of the diversity of framing perspectives within an institutional arrangement, the presence of a mediator is considered important to help reframings to happen. However, the existence of the mediators and their role were not clear in the empirical results. This element should also be investigated in other sectors, such as mobility, housing, sanitation planning, in order to measure the relevance of the mediator in different governance processes cases.

The heuristic tool also allowed us to uncover the fact that the inclusion of recommendations in the final version of the plan does not automatically indicates a successful collaboration. The stakeholders did not judge the quality of collaborative processes based on the inclusion of the recommendations, but based on the opportunities to participate throughout the process. This aspect was clearly identified in the analyzed cases.

Finally, there are some elements and aspects identified as crucial to the collaboration in governance process that are not clearly indicated in the heuristic tool, but that are contained in its variables, such as the distinction between formal and informal procedures and the importance of communication. As suggested by the empirical results, these elements impact substantially the collaboration and should be taken into account for

adjustments in the heuristic model, in order to emphasize its importance in governance processes.

The findings from the three papers suggest some patterns of interactions in governance processes.

First, the endurance of informal institutions might hinder substantial breakthroughs in governance processes, even in cases where the institutional arrangement is composed of a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors and organizations. However, the democratic composition of an institutional arrangement is the first step toward a gradual transformation process to create a collaborative culture that leads to collectively developed plans.

Second, path dependence on ideas, behaviors and actions might reinforce informal institutions and informal institutionalized interdependence between some stakeholders, reinforcing restrictive practices in planning processes that have been established for decades. Therefore, even if the institutional arrangement is composed of a variety of actors and organizations, the absence of neutral elements that can promote balance between the stakeholders and a collaborative environment can prevent the development of collective construction. In these cases, the process may be manipulated, and the final product may be vulnerable to existing imbalances of power in the institutional arrangement, and will only address the interests of those who are routinely invited to collaborate.

Third, processes of co-optation weaken the principles of governance. The legitimacy and representativeness of participatory processes are undermined in contexts where stakeholders perceive that open interaction is restricted to specific actors and organizations determined by governmental organizations, and where the outcome of the participatory process is determined in advance or in non-transparent spaces by specific groups.

Fourth, the communication message is a political and planning tool that can be framed to maintain stakeholder interest or make them interested in participating. Planners and elected officials therefore play an important role in communicating planning objectives, instigating collaboration, and improving public participation, in terms of both quantity and substance. Public mobilization and the way the process is presented and publicized by

political and planning authorities impact the framing perspectives and reframings, fostering or minimizing people's interest in participating.

Fifth, the collaborative process is not judged on the inclusion of recommendations, but rather on the quality of the interactions and on the perception of the stakeholders of being heard. If the stakeholders consider there was no space for wide and equal participation, the legitimacy of the collaborative process will be compromised, even if the proposals are incorporated in the final products of the processes.

This thesis raises a number of issues that request further attention. First, the analyzed planning processes point to very similar results in terms of institutional dynamics and outcomes, despite differences in terms of scale, subject, culture, and political context. Considering that the communication message is a political and planning tool which can be framed to keep stakeholders interested or make them interested into participating, future research should focus on the role and different types of communication messages in urban planning, and on how it can improve public participation in terms of quantity as well as substance. Furthermore, analysis of the perception of politicians and planners have of their role in communicating planning objectives might be equally valuable. Second, research efforts should also focus on proposals of some groups that might be not relevant for the scale or scope of a plan, but could be integrated later at a more appropriate level, which might be considered part of a collaborative governance. Since processes can evolve over time and plans must be considered within the metropolitan context because of the cascade characteristic of urban planning, analysis of the next Curitiba Master Plan and Montreal Master Plan processes could be interesting. Finally, the planning regime as a whole, including all the metropolitan, regional and local plans, should be evaluated in order to qualify the extent of collaboration between planning authorities and stakeholders within each region.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 05 – Recruitment E-mail - Curitiba

Prezado (Inserir o nome do entrevistado),

O propósito deste estudo é determinar como a composição, a dinâmica entre os envolvidos e a performance da liderança interna ao arranjo institucional e ao longo do processo influencia na eficácia da governança colaborativa. E, a partir daí, verificar como a qualidade da governança colaborativa é refletida nos documentos finais do processo.

Para tanto, propõe-se a realização de um estudo de caso comparativo entre o processo de elaboração do Plano Diretor de Curitiba e o processo de elaboração do Projet de Schéma d´aménagement et de développement de l´agglomeration de Montréal. Apesar de terem sido construídos em culturas de planejamento diferentes, ambos correspondem a processos recentes, finalizados em 2015.

Para a seleção dos entrevistados, recorreu-se a i) um rastreamento em atas dos eventos formais e informais realizados referentes aos processos de elaboração dos planos; ii) verificação em sítios eletrônicos, artigos de opinião e jornais. O grupo de entrevistados é composto por representantes de organizações governamentais e não-governamentais, representantes da acamia, representantes da imprensa e representantes da sociedade civil. Nós iremos entrevistas 10 pessoas em Curitiba e 10 pessoas em Montreal, e nós gostaríamos de entrevistá-lo na sua qualidade de --. A entrevista consiste em responder a perguntas semi-estruturadas, com duração prevista entre 45 à 75 minutos, podendo ocorrer em um local e em um momento conveniente para você. Todas as entrevistas são confidenciais e seus comentários não serão atribuídos especificamente para você ou sua organização.

Mais detalhes serão fornecidos no projeto e no processo de entrevista no nosso "Termo de Consentimento", apresentado no momento (ou antes, se você preferir).

Esse projeto foi aprovado pelo Comitê de Ética e Pesquisa da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná – PUCPR, número de aprovação: 1.290.325; e pelo Comitê de Ética e Pesquisa da Universidade de Laval, Quebec, Canadá, número de aprovação: 2015-216 / 18-11-2015.

Nós gostaríamos muito de ter a sua participação no nosso estudo. Aguardamos seu posicionamento a respeito de sua disponibilidade. Qualquer comentário ou sugestão de sua parte serão, evidentemente, bem-vindos.

Atenciosamente,

Débora Follador
Arquiteta e Urbanista
Mestre em Gestão Urbana pela PUCPR
Doutoranda em Gestão Urbana pela PUCPR e em Planejamento do Território e do Desenvolvimento Regional, na Universidade de Laval, Quebec, Canadá.
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Appendix 06 – Consent Form - Curitiba

TERMO DE CONSENTIMENTO LIVRE E ESCLARECIDO

Você está sendo convidado(a) como voluntário(a) a participar do estudo Arranjos institucionais e governança colaborativa no planejamento urbano: uma análise comparativa entre Curitiba e Montréal e que tem como objetivo determinar como a composição, a dinâmica entre os envolvidos e a performance da liderança interna ao arranjo institucional e ao longo do processo influencia na eficácia da governança colaborativa. E, a partir daí, verificar como a qualidade da governança colaborativa é refletida nos documentos finais do processo. Acreditamos que ela seja importante pois auxiliará no entendimento sobre quais elementos são determinantes para o desenvolvimento da governança colaborativa e respectivos produtos finais.

PARTICIPAÇÃO NO ESTUDO

A minha participação no referido estudo será de responder a 19 perguntas, em local de minha preferência. A duração estimada para a entrevista é de 45 a 75 minutos.

RISCOS E BENEFÍCIOS

Fui alertado de que, da pesquisa a se realizar, posso esperar alguns benefícios, tais como saber que contribui para a compreensão do tema investigado. Recebi, também, os esclarecimentos necessários sobre os possíveis desconfortos e riscos decorrentes do estudo, levando-se em conta que é uma pesquisa, e os resultados positivos ou negativos somente serão obtidos após a sua realização. Ficou claro para mim que os riscos razoavelmente previsíveis ou desconfortos são inexistentes.

SIGILO E PRIVACIDADE

Estou ciente de que minha privacidade será respeitada, ou seja, meu nome ou qualquer outro dado ou elemento que possa, de qualquer forma, me identificar, será mantido em sigilo. Os pesquisadores se responsabilizam pela guarda e confidencialidade dos dados, bem como a não exposição dos dados de pesquisa.

AUTONOMIA

É assegurada a assistência durante toda pesquisa, bem como me é garantido o livre acesso a todas as informações e esclarecimentos adicionais sobre o estudo e suas consequências, enfim, tudo o que eu queira saber antes, durante e depois da minha participação. Também fui informado de que posso me recusar a participar do estudo, ou retirar meu consentimento a qualquer momento, sem precisar justificar, e de, por desejar sair da pesquisa, não sofrerei qualquer prejuízo à assistência que venho recebendo.

RESSARCIMENTO E INDENIZAÇÃO

Caso eu tenha qualquer despesa decorrente da participação na pesquisa, tais como transporte, alimentação entre outros, haverá ressarcimento dos valores gastos na forma seguinte: mediante depósito em conta corrente.
De igual maneira, caso ocorra algum dano decorrente da minha participação no estudo, serei devidamente indenizado, conforme determina a lei.

CONTATO

A pesquisadora envolvida com o referido projeto é a Débora Pinto Follador, vinculada à Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, e com ela poderei manter contato pelo telefone (41) 9652 6712 ou pelo email deborafollador@gmail.com

O Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa em Seres Humanos (CEP) é composto por um grupo de pessoas que estão trabalhando para garantir que seus direitos como participante de pesquisa sejam respeitados. Ele tem a obrigação de avaliar se a pesquisa foi planejada e se está sendo executada de forma ética. Se você achar que a pesquisa não está sendo realizada da forma como você imaginou ou que está sendo prejudicado de alguma forma, você pode entrar em contato com o Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa da PUCPR (CEP) pelo telefone (41) 3271-2292 entre segunda e sexta-feira das 08h00 as 17h30 ou pelo e-mail nep@pucpr.br.

Esse projeto foi aprovado pelo Comitê de Ética e Pesquisa da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná – PUCPR, número de aprovação: 1.290.325; e pelo Comitê de Ética e Pesquisa da Universidade de Laval, Quebec, Canadá, número de aprovação: 2015-216 / 18-11-2015.

DECLARAÇÂO

Declaro que li e entendi todas as informações presentes neste Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido e tive a oportunidade de discutir as informações deste termo. Todas as minhas perguntas foram respondidas e eu estou satisfeito com as respostas. Entendo que receberei uma via assinada e datada deste documento e que outra via assinada e datada será arquivada nos pelo pesquisador responsável do estudo.

Enfim, tendo sido orientado quanto ao teor de todo o aqui mencionado e compreendido a natureza e o objetivo do já referido estudo, manifesto meu livre consentimento em participar, estando totalmente ciente de que não há nenhum valor econômico, a receber ou a pagar, por minha participação.

Dados do participante da pesquisa	
Nome:	
Telefone:	
e-mail:	

Curitiba, _____ de _____ de _____.

_____   _____
Assinatura do participante da pesquisa   Assinatura do Pesquisador

USO DE ÁUDIO

Autorizo o uso de minha gravação de áudio para fins da pesquisa.

_____   _____
Assinatura do participante da pesquisa   Assinatura do Pesquisador

Appendix 07 – Recruitment E-mail - Montreal

Bonjour (Insert Name),

Cette recherche consiste en une étude de cas comparative des processus d'élaboration du Plan directeur de Curitiba et du processus d'élaboration du Schéma d'aménagement et de développement de l'agglomération de Montréal. Le but de l'étude est de préciser comment l'arrangement institutionnel peut influencer la qualité du processus de planification et d'identifier les conséquences de la qualité de la gouvernance collaborative sur le plan régional.

Le groupe de répondants est composé de représentants des organisations gouvernementales et non-gouvernementales, de chercheurs, de journalistes, ainsi que des représentants de la société civile de chaque région métropolitaine. Nous rencontrons une dizaine de répondants par région et nous apprécierions si vous acceptiez d'être interviewé en votre qualité de ---------------------.

Cette entrevue, dirigée en français sous le sceau de la confidentialité, consiste à répondre à une série de questions ouvertes. Elle serait d'une durée d'environ une heure et se tiendrait dans un lieu et un moment de votre choix. Davantage d'information sur le projet de recherche et le processus d'entrevue (dont le formulaire de consentement) vous sera présenté à ce moment (ou précédemment si vous le préférez).

Ce projet de recherche été approuvé par le Comité d'éthique de la recherche avec des êtres humains de la Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná – PUCPR (approbation no. 1.290.325) et par le Comité d'éthique de la recherche avec des êtres humains de l'Université Laval (approbation no. 2015-216 / 18-11-2015).

Je serai à Montréal afin de conduire les entrevues dans les semaines du --------------.

Votre participation à notre projet de recherche serait très appréciée et nous attendons de vos nouvelles concernant votre disponibilité.

Tout commentaire ou suggestion de votre part serait bienvenu.

Bien à vous,

Débora P. Follador
Candidate au doctorat en aménagement du territoire et développement régional (Université Laval) et en gestion urbaine (PUCPR)
École supérieure d'aménagement du territoire et de développement régional
Université Laval
E-mail: debora.follador.1@ulaval.ca

Appendix 08 – Consent Form - Montreal

Formulaire de consentement

Présentation du chercheur

Cette recherche est réalisée dans le cadre du projet de doctorat de Débora Pinto Follador, dirigé par Mario Carrier, professeur à l'École supérieure d´Aménagement du territoire et de Développement régional (ÉSAD) de l'Université Laval, en co-tutelle avec Fabio Duarte, professeur à l'Institut de Gestion et de Planification Urbaine de l'Université Pontificale Catholique du Paraná, au Brésil.

Avant d'accepter de participer à ce projet de recherche, veuillez prendre le temps de lire et de comprendre les renseignements qui suivent. Ce document vous explique le but de ce projet de recherche, ses procédures, avantages, risques et inconvénients. Nous vous invitons à poser toutes les questions que vous jugerez utiles à la personne qui vous présente ce document.

Nature de l'étude

Le but de la recherche est de préciser comment l'arrangement institutionnel peut influencer la qualité du processus de planification et d'identifier les conséquences de la qualité de la gouvernance collaborative sur le plan régional. Par conséquent, la recherche consiste en une étude de cas comparative des processus d'élaboration du plan directeur de Curitiba et du processus d'élaboration du Schéma d'aménagement et de développement de l'agglomération de Montréal. Ces deux villes/régions sont des cas récents (les plans ayant été adoptés en 2015), et avaient l'intention de mettre en œuvre un processus de gouvernance concertée incluant la participation des différents acteurs et organisations qui composent le milieu municipal.

Déroulement de la participation

Votre participation à cette recherche consiste à participer à une entrevue, d'une durée d'environ une heure, qui portera sur les éléments suivants:

- Votre implication en tant que répondant dans le processus de consultation;
- Vos attitudes face au processus de consultation;
- Votre perception quand à l'évaluation du processus de consultation.

Avantages, risques ou inconvénients possibles liés à votre participation, (compensation, le cas échéant)

Le fait de participer à cette recherche vous offre une occasion de réfléchir et de discuter en toute confidentialité, à votre propre comportement face aux processus de la gouvernance collaborative pour l´eboration du plan de développement.

Il n'y a pas de risque prévisible ou de malaise liés à la participation à cette recherche.

Ce projet de recherche été approuvé par le Comité d'éthique de la recherche avec des êtres humains de la Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná – PUCPR (approbation no. 1.290.325) e par le Comité d'éthique de la recherche avec des êtres humains de l'Université Laval (approbation no. 2015-216 / 18-11-2015).

Participation volontaire et droit de retrait

Vous êtes libre de participer à ce projet de recherche. Vous pouvez aussi mettre fin à votre participation sans conséquence négative ou préjudice et sans avoir à justifier votre décision. Si vous décidez de mettre fin à votre participation, il est important d'en prévenir le chercheur dont les coordonnées sont incluses dans ce document. Tous les renseignements personnels vous concernant seront alors détruits.

Confidentialité et gestion des données

Les mesures suivantes seront appliquées pour assurer la confidentialité des renseignements fournis par les participants:

- les noms des participants ne paraîtront dans aucun rapport;
- les divers documents de la recherche seront codifiés et seul le chercheur aura accès à la liste des noms et des codes;
- les résultats individuels des participants ne seront jamais communiqués;
- les matériaux de la recherche, incluant les données et les enregistrements, seront conservés dans l'ordinateur personnel de Débora Follaror, protégé par un mot de passe. Ils seront détruits deux ans après la fin de la recherche, soit en juin 2018;
- la recherche fera l'objet de publications dans des revues scientifiques, et aucun participant ne pourra y être identifié ;
- un court résumé des résultats de la recherche sera expédié aux participants qui en feront la demande en indiquant l'adresse où ils aimeraient recevoir le document, juste après l'espace prévu pour leur signature.

Remerciements

Votre collaboration est précieuse pour nous permettre de réaliser cette étude et nous vous remercions d'y participer.

Signatures

Je soussigné(e) _____consens librement à participer à la recherche intitulée : « ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONNELS ET GOUVERNANCE COLLABORATIVE DANS LES PROCESSUS DE PLANIFICATION URBAINE: UNE ANALYSE COMPARATIVE DES VILLES DE CURITIBA ET MONTRÉAL ». J'ai pris connaissance du formulaire et j'ai compris le but, la nature, les avantages, les risques et les inconvénients du projet de recherche. Je suis satisfait(e) des explications, précisions et réponses que le chercheur m'a fournies, le cas échéant, quant à ma participation à ce projet.

_____   _____

Signature du participant, de la participante   Date

Un court résumé des résultats de la recherche sera expédié aux participants qui en feront la demande en indiquant l'adresse où ils aimeraient recevoir le document. **Les résultats ne seront pas disponibles avant le 1er avril 2017. Si cette adresse changeait d'ici cette date, vous êtes invité(e) à informer la chercheure de la nouvelle adresse où vous souhaitez recevoir ce document.**

L'adresse (électronique ou postale) à laquelle je souhaite recevoir un court résumé des résultats de la recherche est la suivante :

_____

_____

_____

J'ai expliqué le but, la nature, les avantages, les risques et les inconvénients du projet de recherche au participant. J'ai répondu au meilleur de ma connaissance aux questions posées et j'ai vérifié la compréhension du participant.

_____   _____

Signature du chercheur   Date

Renseignements supplémentaires

Si vous avez des questions sur la recherche, sur les implications de votre participation ou si vous souhaitez vous retirer de la recherche, veuillez communiquer avec Mario Carrier, Professeur, Université Laval, au numéro de téléphone suivant : (418) 656-2131, poste 5814 ou à l'adresse courriel suivante : mario.carrier@esad.ulaval.ca.

Plaintes ou critiques

Toute plainte ou critique sur ce projet de recherche pourra être adressée au Bureau de l'Ombudsman de l'Université Laval :

Pavillon Alphonse-Desjardins, bureau 3320
2325, rue de l'Université
Université Laval
Québec (Québec) G1V 0A6
Renseignements - Secrétariat : (418) 656-3081
Ligne sans frais : 1-866-323-2271
Courriel : info@ombudsman.ulaval.ca

Copie du participant

ARRANJOS INSTITUCIONAIS E GOVERNANÇA COLABORATIVA NO PLANEJAMENTO URBANO: Uma análise comparativa entre Curitiba e Montreal

Protocolo de Entrevista

Débora Follador, Outubro 2015

Programa de Pós-graduação em Gestão Urbana, PUCPR

École supérieure d'aménagement du territoire et de développement régional, Université Laval

Contextualização Preliminar

Governança colaborativa para a realização de processos de planejamento tem sido a forma adotada por muitos municípios em todo o mundo . Como consequência, ao menos em teoria, a elaboração de planos de desenvolvimento tem transbordado os limites técnicos e econômicos, acontecendo de forma compartilhada com as considerações e contribuições colocadas por diferentes organizações e atores que compõem o arranjo institucional do processo.

O propósito deste estudo é determinar como a composição, a dinâmica entre os envolvidos e a performance da liderança interna ao arranjo institucional e ao longo do processo influencia na eficácia da governança colaborativa. E, a partir daí, verificar como a qualidade da governança colaborativa é refletida nos documentos finais do processo.

Para tanto, propõe-se a realização de um estudo de caso comparativo entre o processo de elaboração do Plano Diretor de Curitiba e o processo de elaboração do Projet de Schéma d´aménagement et de développement de l´agglomeration de Montréal. Apesar de terem sido construídos em culturas de planejamento diferentes, ambos correspondem a processos recentes, finalizados em 2015.

Todas as entrevistas são confidenciais e o anonimato dos entrevistados é garantido.

Você tem alguma pergunta?

ENTREVISTA SEMI-ESTRUTURADA

I. CARACTERÍSTICAS DO ENTREVISTADO	Cod.
Nome:	**Data.**
Contato:	
Local:	

	Organização governamental municipal	(Nome da organização)
	Organização governamental estadual	
	Organização não-governamental municipal	
	Organização não-governamental estadual	
	Empresa privada	
	Academia	
	Mídia	
	Sociedade civil	
QUESTÕES		
As questões a seguir referem-se ao processo participativo para elaboração do plano		

01	Você poderia me falar sobre esse processo participativo? Quais eram suas expectativas no início do processo? Sobre o que suas expectativas iniciais foram baseadas?
02	Você lembra quais organizações participaram do processo?
03	Tiveram pessoas que não estavam representando alguma organização e que se destacaram no processo? Você pode me dar exemplos?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
04	Qual foi o teu interesse, de um ponto de vista estratégico, em participar deste processo?

05	Houve alguns elementos que impediram a participação de pessoas e organizações no processo?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
06	Havia alguma pessoa ou organização que mediou quaisquer opiniões diferentes entre pessoas e organizações, que ajudaram na interação entre os envolvidos no processo participativo e que tornaram a colaboração mais fácil? Você pode me dar exemplos?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
07	Havia uma pessoa ou uma organização que ajudou a construir a confiança e promoveu diálogos entre as organizações e as pessoas que participaram do processo? Você pode me dar exemplos?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
08	Quantas vezes você foi convidado a participar neste processo?
09	Você acha que todos os participantes no processo estavam cientes da problemática e foram treinados ou capacitados para participar? Você pode me dar exemplos positivos e negativos?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
10	Você acha que houve objetivos e metas comuns entre os participantes antes, durante e após o processo? Você pode me dar exemplos?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não

11	Você tem uma ideia clara das diferentes etapas no processo participativo e onde sua participação se localizou nessas diferentes fases do processo?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
12	De que forma, exatamente, você participou? Grupos temático, fóruns, simpósios, painéis, reuniões, entrevista individual, escreveu alguma dissertação, respondeu a questionários, participou de algum comitê? De modo formal ou informal?
13	As suas recomendações ou propostas foram incluídas no plano? Por que você acha que isso aconteceu?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
14	Você considera que o processo participativo para elaboração do plano foi um sucesso ou fracasso? Por quê?
15	Durante a sua participação, você teve qualquer interação com outros representantes de outras organizações? Se sim: quando ou em que etapa do processo? De que forma: reuniões formais, eventos informais? Por favor, especifique.
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
16	Você acha que todos os envolvidos têm a mesma avaliação do processo como um todo? Por quê?
	☐ Sim ☐ Não
17	Você acha que a partir deste processo participativo, as pessoas vão participar dos próximos processos participativos? Por quê?

	☐ Sim ☐ Não	
18	Como você acha que o processo participativo para elaboração dos próximos planos deve acontecer? Você pode me dar exemplos?	
19	Por último, gostaria de acrescentar algum comentário?	

ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONNELS ET GOUVERNANCE COLLABORATIVE DANS LES PROCESSUS DE PLANIFICATION URBAINE:

UNE ANALYSE COMPARATIVE DES VILLES DE CURITIBA ET MONTRÉAL

Protocole d'Entrevue

Débora Follador, Août 2015

Programa de Pós-graduação em Gestão Urbana, PUCPR

École supérieure d'aménagement du territoire et de développement régional

Université Laval

Remarques préliminaires

La gouvernance collaborative est devenue une stratégie adoptée par un bon nombre de gouvernements à travers le monde afin de mener à bien leur processus de planification. Conséquemment, du moins en théorie, l'élaboration des plans de développement ne tient pas uniquement compte des considérations techniques, économiques et politiques, mais inclut aussi les considérations et contributions apportées par les différents acteurs et organisations qui font partie de l'arrangement institutionnel du processus de planification, lequel est co-construit sur une base collaborative.

Cette étude vise à déterminer la manière dont la composition, la dynamique interne de l'arrangement institutionnel et la performance du leadership à l'intérieur de l'arrangement institutionnel et à travers le processus de planification influence l'efficacité de la gouvernance collaborative. De là, il sera possible de déterminer comment l'efficacité de la gouvernance est reflétée dans les versions finales des plans de développement.

Cette recherche consiste en une étude de cas comparative des processus d'élaboration du Plan directeur de Curitiba et du processus d'élaboration du Schéma d'aménagement et de développement de l'agglomération de Montréal. Bien que ces démarches de planification aient eu lieu dans deux pays à la culture différente, ces deux villes/régions sont des cas récents (les plans ayant été adoptés en 2015), et avaient l'intention de mettre en œuvre un processus de gouvernance concertée incluant la participation des différents acteurs et organisations qui composent le milieu municipal.

Toutes les entrevues sont confidentielles et l'anonymat des répondants et préservée.

Avant de commencer, avez-vous des questions ?

II. CARACTERISTIQUES DU RÉPONDANT	Cod.
Nom:	Date.
Coordonnées:	
Lieu de l'entrevue:	

	(Nom de l'organisation)
Municipalité	
Province/État	
ONG Municipale	
ONG au niveau de la province ou de l'état	
Entreprise privée	
Université	
Média	
Société civile	

QUESTIONS
Les questions suivantes portent sur le processus de participation entourant le développement du plan

| 01	Pourriez-vous décrire le processus de participation de manière générale? Au départ, quelles étaient vos attentes par rapport au processus? Sur quoi ces attentes étaient-elles basées?
02	Selon votre souvenir, quelles organisations ont participé au processus de participation?
03	Y a-t'il certains individus qui ne représentaient aucune organisation qui se sont démarqués lors du processus? Pourriez-vous me donner des exemples?
	☐ Yes ☐ No
04	D'un point de vue stratégique, quel était votre intérêt à participer à ce processus?

05	Y a-t'il certains éléments qui ont entravé la participation d'individus et d'organisations au processus de consultation?
☐ Yes ☐ No	
06	Y a-t'il une personne ou une organisation qui a agit comme médiateur entre les différentes opinions des individus et des organisations? Qui ont facilité l'interaction entre les participants au processus de consultation ou qui ont rendu la collaboration plus facile? Pourriez-vous me donner des exemples concrets?
☐ Yes ☐ No	
07	Y-avait-t'il une personne ou une organisation qui a contribué à accroitre la confiance et à facilité le dialogue entre les organisations et les individus participants au processus? Pouvez-vous me donner un ou des exemples concrets?
☐ Yes ☐ No	
08	Combien de fois votre participation au processus a-t'elle été sollicitée?
09	Croyez-vous que tous les participants au processus étaient conscients des enjeux de planification, étaient qualifiés ou capables de participer de manière efficace au processus? Pourriez-vous me donner des exemples positifs et négatifs?
☐ Yes ☐ No	

10	Pensez-vous qu'il y avait des objectifs et buts communs entre les participants avant, pendant et après le processus? Pourriez-vous me donner des exemples?
	☐ Yes ☐ No

11	Avez-vous une idée claire des différentes étapes du processus de consultation et de l'endroit où se situait votre participation à travers les différentes étapes du processus?
	☐ Yes ☐ No
12	Quelle forme votre participation au processus a-t'elle prit exactement? Groupes focus; Forums; Symposiums; Panels; Meetings; Entrevues individuelles; Rédaction de documents; Expertise; Questionnaire; Comité de travail? Votre participation s'est-elle effectuée de manière formelle ou informelle?
13	Est-ce que vos recommandations ou propositions furent incluses dans le plan? Pourquoi, selon vous, n'ont-elles pas été pris en compte, ou ont-elles été prises en compte?
	☐ Yes ☐ No
14	Considérez-vous que le processus de participation pour le développement du plan ait été un succès ou un échec? Et pourquoi?
15	Au cours du processus, avez-vous eu des interactions avec des représentants d'autres organisations participantes? Si oui, quand et dans quelle(s) étape(s) du processus cela a eu lieu? Quelle(s) forme(s) ces interactions ont-elles prises : événements formels ou rencontres informelles?
	☐ Yes ☐ No
16	Pensez vous que toutes les parties impliquées dans le processus font la même

	évaluation du processus de planification en entier? Pourquoi?
	☐ Yes ☐ No
17	Suite à ce processus de participation, pensez-vous que les organisations et individus vont participer au prochain processus de participation? Pourquoi?
18	Comment pensez-vous que le processus de consultation afin de développer les prochains plans devrait-il se dérouler? Pourriez-vous me donner des exemples?
19	Finalement, voudriez-vous ajouter quoi que ce soit à vos propos?
	☐ Yes ☐ No

Merci d'avoir participé à notre étude!

Appendix 11 – PUCPR Clearance From

PARECER CONSUBSTANCIADO DO CEP

DADOS DO PROJETO DE PESQUISA

Título da Pesquisa: ARRANJOS INSTITUCIONAIS E GOVERNANÇA COLABORATIVA NO PLANEJAMENTO URBANO: Uma análise comparativa entre Curitiba e Montréal

Pesquisador: Débora Pinto Follador

Área Temática:

Versão: 1

CAAE: 50129515.3.0000.0020

Instituição Proponente: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Parana - PUCPR

Patrocinador Principal: Financiamento Próprio

DADOS DO PARECER

Número do Parecer: 1.290.325

Apresentação do Projeto:

Nesse estudo, a análise a ser desenvolvida tem como foco os arranjos institucionais no processo de governança colaborativa. Considerando que cada cultura de planejamento possui uma composição de arranjo institucional, faz-se interessante analisar o desempenho da governança colaborativa para a elaboração de planos de desenvolvimento conforme os diferentes arranjos de planejamento.

Para tanto, propõe-se a realização de um estudo de caso comparativo entre o processo de elaboração do Plano Diretor de Curitiba e o processo de elaboração do Projet de Schéma d'aménagement et de développement de l'agglomeration de Montreal. Ambos tratam-se de processos recentes, finalizados em 2015, e tinham a pretensão de acontecer aos moldes da governança colaborativa, com a inclusão e participação dos diferentes atores e organizações que compõem o ambiente municipal.

Objetivo da Pesquisa:

O objetivo é determinar como a composição, a dinâmica entre os envolvidos e a performance da liderança interna ao arranjo institucional e ao longo do processo influencia na eficácia da governança colaborativa. E, a partir daí, verificar como a qualidade da governança colaborativa é refletida nos documentos finais do processo.

Endereço: Rua Imaculada Conceição 1155
Bairro: Prado Velho   **CEP:** 80.215-901
UF: PR   **Município:** CURITIBA
Telefone (41)3271-2103   **Fax:** (41)3271-2103   **E-mail:** nep@pucpr.br

Continuação do Parecer: 1.290.325

Avaliação dos Riscos e Benefícios:

Riscos:

Os riscos razoavelmente previsíveis ou desconfortos são inexistentes.

Benefícios:

O benefício que o participante vai obter a partir da sua participação no estudo é saber que contribuiu para a compreensão do tema investigado.

Comentários e Considerações sobre a Pesquisa:

Projeto com desenho adequado e claro de acordo com os parâmetros do CEP.

Considerações sobre os Termos de apresentação obrigatória:

Corretos.

Recomendações:

Sem recomendações suplementares.

Conclusões ou Pendências e Lista de Inadequações:

Aprovado.

Considerações Finais a critério do CEP:

Lembramos aos senhores pesquisadores que, no cumprimento da Resolução 466/12, o Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa (CEP) deverá receber relatórios anuais sobre o andamento do estudo, bem como a qualquer tempo e a critério do pesquisador nos casos de relevância, além do envio dos relatos de eventos adversos, para conhecimento deste Comitê.

Salientamos ainda, a necessidade de relatório completo ao final do estudo. Eventuais modificações ou emendas ao protocolo devem ser apresentadas ao CEP-PUCPR de forma clara e sucinta, identificando a parte do protocolo a ser modificado e as suas justificativas.

Este parecer foi elaborado baseado nos documentos abaixo relacionados:

Tipo Documento	Arquivo	Postagem	Autor	Situaçã
Informações Básicas do Projeto	PB_INFORMAÇÕES_BÁSICAS_DO_PROJETO_604247.pdf	15/10/2015 16:56:12		Aceit
Outros	ProtocoloEntrevista_DeboraFollador.pdf	15/10/2015 16:55:50	Débora Pinto Follador	Aceit
Folha de Rosto	FolhaRosto_DeboraFollador2.pdf	13/10/2015 09:38:45	Débora Pinto Follador	Aceit
Declaração de	AutorizacaoOrganizacao_DeboraFolla	07/10/2015	Débora Pinto	Aceit

Continuação do Parecer: 1.290.325

Instituição e Infraestrutura	dor.pdf	10:42:02	Follador	Aceit
Outros	EMAIL_SolicitacaoEntrevista_DeboraFollador.pdf	07/10/2015 10:40:48	Débora Pinto Follador	Aceit
Cronograma	CRONOGRAMA_DeboraFollador.pdf	07/10/2015 10:40:04	Débora Pinto Follador	Aceit
Projeto Detalhado / Brochura Investigador	LATTES_DeboraFollador.pdf	07/10/2015 10:39:22	Débora Pinto Follador	Aceit
Projeto Detalhado / Brochura Investigador	ProjetoDetalhado_DeboraFollador.pdf	07/10/2015 10:37:27	Débora Pinto Follador	Aceit
TCLE / Termos de Assentimento / Justificativa de Ausência	TCLE_TermoDeConsentimento_Debora Follador.pdf	07/10/2015 10:35:41	Débora Pinto Follador	Aceit

Situação do Parecer:
Aprovado

Necessita Apreciação da CONEP:
Não

CURITIBA, 21 de Outubro de 2015

_____

Assinado por:
NAIM AKEL FILHO
(Coordenador)

Appendix 12 – Université Laval Clearance Form

Mesures de suivi associées à l'approbation éthique

Pour le projet intitulé : **Institutional Arrangements & Collaborative Governance of Urban Planning Processes: A comparative case study of Curitiba and Montreal**

(numéro de dossier : 2015-216)

1. Informer le Comité par écrit et dans les meilleurs délais (indépendamment du calendrier de ses réunions statutaires) des situations suivantes si elles se présentent :

   - de **toute modification au projet,** comme il a été approuvé en ce jour, qui comporterait des changements dans le choix des participants, dans le recrutement, dans la manière d'obtenir leur consentement, de réaliser la collecte des données ou encore, dans les risques ou inconvénients encourus par la participation, et ce, préalablement à l'application de ce changement (modèle de lettre de demande d'amendement disponible sur le site Internet des CÉRUL);

   - de **toute modification** qui serait apportée à un **instrument utilisé pour le recrutement** (annonces, affiches, etc.), pour confirmer le **consentement** (formulaire de consentement, feuillet d'information, etc.) ou pour effectuer la **collecte** des données (questionnaire, grille d'entrevue, etc.) en fournissant la nouvelle version du document concerné, où les modifications auront été mises en évidence, préalablement à son utilisation;

   - de **tout événement imprévu et sérieux** (ex. : détresse psychologique d'un participant, menace proférée à l'égard d'une personne, effets secondaires ou imprévus ou indésirables d'un produit, d'un médicament ou d'un test, etc.) qui surviendrait dans le déroulement d'une activité du présent projet et qui impliquerait un participant, en complétant le formulaire VRR-EI disponible sur le site Internet des CÉRUL;

   - de l'**interruption prématurée de ce projet de recherche** pour une raison quelconque, qu'il soit financé ou non, y compris en raison de la suspension ou de l'annulation de l'approbation d'un organisme subventionnaire.

2. Tant que la collecte des données ne sera pas définitivement terminée, présenter annuellement une **demande de renouvellement** de l'approbation, en fournissant un rapport sur le déroulement de la recherche, le nombre de participants recrutés et, le cas échéant, sur les difficultés rencontrées en cours de réalisation, à l'aide du formulaire VRR-107 qui doit être transmis au Comité dans un délai de 2 à 3 semaines avant la date de fin de l'approbation.

Je soussignée, _Débora Pedroso_ , **ai pris connaissance des mesures de suivi précitées** qui sont associées à l'émission de l'approbation de ce projet et j'accepte de les appliquer durant toute la durée de cette recherche dont je suis la chercheure étudiante responsable.

Signature de la chercheure étudiante responsable : _Pedroso_ Date: 2015 / 11 / 22

Appendix 13 – List of Quotes

	LIST OF QUOTES
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT	Pre-existing conditions; Incentives to participate; Interests to participate; History of conflict / alliances; Balance of knowledge, power and resources; Social capital; Trust; Interdependence; Framing perspectives; Culture;
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE	Communication; Common goals; Consensus; Openness to mutual gains; Commitment; Incorporation of proposals; Transparency; Role of mediator;

Protocol

AL FRAMEWORK	QUOTES	STUDY QUESTIONS	SOURCE	INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
	Incentives to participate; Interests to participate;	Of which organizations and actors was the institutional arrangement composed?	Documentary research; Interviews (Questions 02 and 03);	02. From what you remember, which organizations participated in the process? 03. Were there any individuals who were not representing any organization who stood out in the process? Can you give me examples?
N, A.; FARJOUN, M. ANSELL, C. 2007); HODGSON, G. PBELL, J. (2002); NORTH, D. C. (1994); M. (2005); HALL, P. 2003); TSEBELIS, G. HA, C. V. (2005); ; VODOZ, L. (2013); LIOTT, M.; SHMUELI, WARZ, R. (2006); H. (2009); ANTUNES, CEIÇÃO, O. (2002); LOPES, H. C. (2013); C. (2007); THÉRET, B. 003);	Pre-existing conditions; History of conflict/alliances; Framing perspectives; Planning culture;	What is the institutional legacy?	Documentary research;	-
		Of which formal institutions was the institutional arrangement composed?	Documentary research; Interviews (Question 01);	01.Could you tell me about this participatory process? What were your expectations at the beginning of the process? On what your initials expectations were based?
		Of which informal institutions was the institutional arrangement composed?	Documentary research; Interviews (Question 01);	01. Could you tell me about this participatory process? What were your expectations at the beginning of the process? On what your initials expectations were based?
	Pre-existing conditions; History of conflict/alliances; Framing perspectives; Role of Mediator;	What is the conflict history?	Documentary research;	-
		Was the mediator able to mediate the conflicts?	Interview (Question 06);	06. Was there a person or an organization that mediated any different opinions between people and organizations, who helped the interaction among those involved in the participatory process and who made the collaboration easier? Can you give me examples?

[continued]

		Which are the incentives/interests to collaborating in the process?	Documentary research; Interview (Question 04);	04. What was your interest, from a strategic point of view, into participating in this process?
, A.; FARJOUN, M. ANSELL, C. 007); HODGSON, G. BELL, J. (2002); ORTH, D. C. (1994); M. (2005); HALL, P. 003); TSEBELIS, G. A, C. V. (2005); VODOZ, L. (2013); IOTT, M.; SHMUELI, WARZ, R. (2006); . (2009); ANTUNES, EIÇÃO, O. (2002); OPES, H. C. (2013); (2007); THÉRET, B. 003);	Pre-existing conditions; Incentives to participate; Interests to participate; History of conflict/alliances; Social capital; Framing perspectives; Role of mediator;	Why did the organizations/actors choose to participate in the process?	Interview (Question 04);	04. What was your interest, from a strategic point of view, into participating in this process?
		Which are the barriers to collaborating in the process?	Documentary research; Interview (Question 05);	05. Were there any elements that hindered the participation of people and organizations in the consultation process?
		Was the relationship between the actors and organizations horizontal or vertical?	Interview (Question 15);	15. During your participation, did you have any interaction with other representatives of other organizations? If yes: when or which process step? In what form: formal meetings, informal events? Please specify.
		Did the mediator assist in constructing trust between the organizations/actors in the institutional arrangement?	Interview (Question 07);	07. There was a person or an organization that helped to build confidence and provided dialogues between organizations and people who participated? Can you give me examples?

A.; FARJOUN, M. ANSELL, C. 007); HODGSON, G. BELL, J. (2002); ORTH, D. C. (1994); M. (2005); HALL, P. 003); TSEBELIS, G. A, C. V. (2005); VODOZ, L. (2013); IOTT, M.; SHMUELI, WARZ, R. (2006); . (2009); ANTUNES, EIÇÃO, O. (2002); OPES, H. C. (2013); (2007); THÉRET, B. 003);	Framing perspectives; Role of mediator; Planning culture;	Was the mediator part of the institutional arrangement or was the mediator an external element?	Documentary research; final product (Plan); Interview (Questions 02, 03, and 06);	02. From what you remember, which organizations participated in the process? 03. Were there any individuals who were not representing any organization who stood out in the process? Can you give me examples? 06. Was there a person or an organization that mediated any different opinions between people and organizations, who helped the interaction among those involved in the participatory process and who made the collaboration easier? Can you give me examples?
		Was the mediator able to promote reframings aimed at constructing collaborative dialogs?	Interview (Question 06);	06. Was there a person or an organization that mediated any different opinions between people and organizations, who helped the interaction among those involved in the participatory process and who made the collaboration easier? Can you give me examples?
		How should the process take place?	Interview (Question 18);	18. How do you think the participatory process for preparing the next plans should happen? Can you give me examples?

(2006); WEIR, M.; ANSELL, C. (2008); ; NABATCHI, T.; 1); FREY, K. (2007); PHENS, J. (2012); ; ANSELL, C.; GASH, U, N.; YULDASHEV, 009); O'BRIEN, M. AILLARGEON, O.; , M. (2012);	Framing perspectives; Balance of knowledge, power and resources; Role of mediator; Communication; Common goals; Consensus; Transparency; Openness to mutual gains;	Did all the organizations and actors have knowledge about the subject of the plan and were they able to contribute to the process?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan); Interview (Question 09);	09. Do you think that all participants in the process were aware of the issue and were trained to participate? Can you give me examples of YES and NO?
		Were the barriers to collaboration addressed and overcome throughout the process?	Interview (Question 06);	06. Was there a person or an organization that mediated any different opinions between people and organizations, who helped the interaction among those involved in the participatory process and who made the collaboration easier? Can you give me examples?
		Were there disclosure and collective agreement of the rules, mission, schedule, and agreed modes of collaboration?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan);	-
		Did the rules of the process, mission, schedule, and the modes of collaboration occur as agreed at the beginning of the process?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan);	-

(2006); WEIR, M.; ANSELL, C. (2008); ; NABATCHI, T.; 1); FREY, K. (2007); PHENS, J. (2012); ; ANSELL, C.; GASH, U, N.; YULDASHEV, 009); O'BRIEN, M. AILLARGEON, O.; , M. (2012);	Planning culture; Communication; Common goals; Consensus; Openness to mutual gains; Commitment; Transparency; Interdependence;	Were shared vision, consensus, and common objectives built throughout the process?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan); Interview (Question 10);	10. Do you think were built objectives and common goals among the participants in the process? Can you give me examples?
		Were the public hearings deliberative?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan);	-
		Were the organizations and actors directly involved (besides being consulted) in the process?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan); Interview (Questions 11, 12);	11. Do you have a clear idea of the different steps to the consultation process and where your participation was located among the different stages of the process? 12. What form exactly took your participation in this process? Focus groups; Forums; Symposiums; Panels; Meetings; Individual interview; Writing a dissertation; Expertise; Questionnaire; Working committee. In a formal or informal way?
		Was there interdependence between the organizations and actors? In what way?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan);	-

[continued]

(2006); WEIR, M.; ANSELL, C. (2008); ; NABATCHI, T.; 1); FREY, K. (2007); PHENS, J. (2012); ; ANSELL, C.; GASH, U, N.; YULDASHEV, 009); O'BRIEN, M. AILLARGEON, O.; , M. (2012);	Role of mediator; Culture of planning; Balance of knowledge, power and resources; Trust; Transparency; Openness to mutual gains; Incorporation of proposals;	Was there an effort by the mediator in the intermediation of interest?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan);	-
		Did the mediator encourage collaborative governance? In what way?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan); Interview (Question 08);	08. How many times were you asked to participate in this process?
		Was there an effort by the mediator to reinforce confidence and trust between the actors and organizations? In what way?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan); Interview (Questions 06, 07, and 10);	06. Was there a person or an organization that mediated any different opinions between people and organizations, who helped the interaction among those involved in the participatory process and who made the collaboration easier? Can you give me examples? 07. Was there a person or an organization that helped to build confidence and provided dialogues between organizations and people who participated? Can you give me examples? 10. Do you think there were common objectives and goals among the participants before, during, and after the process? Can you give me examples?
		Were different trust levels identified throughout the process?	Interview (Questions 07, 16);	07. There was a person or an organization that helped to build confidence and provided dialogues between organizations and people who participated? Can you give me examples? 16. There was manipulation or influence in any organization or particular person, for the selection of the recommendations and proposals that were included in the plan? Can you give me examples?

[continued]

	Balance of knowledge, power and resources;	Was there shared ownership of the process by the stakeholders?	Interview (Questions 09, 11);	09. Do you think that all participants in the process were aware of the issue and were trained or able to participate? Can you give me positive and negative instances? 11. Do you have a clear idea of the different steps to the consultation process and where your participation was located among the different stages of the process?
(2006); WEIR, M.; ANSELL, C. (2008); ; NABATCHI, T.; 1); FREY, K. (2007); PHENS, J. (2012); ; ANSELL, C.; GASH, U, N.; YULDASHEV, 2009); O'BRIEN, M. AILLARGEON, O.; , M. (2012);	Balance of knowledge, power and resources; Culture of planning; Framing perspectives; Incorporations of proposals;	Were the proposals from the process included in the final document?	Analysis of documents and final product (Plan); Interview (Question 13);	13. Were your recommendations or proposals included in the plan? Why did you think this happened?
		Do all the organizations/actors share a common assessment of the process?	Interview (Questions 14, 15, and 16);	14. Do you consider that the participatory process for developing the plan was a success or failure? Why? 15. During your participation, did you have any interaction with other representatives of other organizations? If yes: when or which process step? In what form: formal meetings, informal events? Please specify. 16. Do you think that everyone involved in the process have the same evaluation of the process as a whole? Why?
		Has a collaborative culture been developed?	Interview (Questions 16, 17);	16. Do you think that everyone involved in the process have the same evaluation of the process as a whole? Why? 17. Do you think from this participatory process, people will take part in the next participatory processes? Why?